THE VALUE CONCEPT IN SOCIOLOGY AND RELATED FIELDS*

CLARENCE MARSH CASE

The University of Southern California

One might be justified in saying that the word *values* has been used with greater precision in economics than in other fields of social study. But it would have to be added that its very precision in that case reduced it to a relative poverty of connotation which limited its usefulness as a key to the interpretation of the larger social life. This deficiency was perceived by Anderson, and in his able pioneer work, *Social Values,* he went a long way toward overcoming it. But in so doing his rather large dependence on sociological ideas made it clear that a concept so basic for the explanation of all social life naturally falls to the task of sociology. Without pretending any real account of value discussions among economists, it is merely remarked here that some further contributions have been made through the economic approach to the general theory of the subject, such as Professor Frank H. Knight's stimulating remarks in the symposium on the bases of morality in *The International Journal of Ethics,*[1] and the discussions of Professor Cooley.

Professor Cooley's chapters on "Valuation" in his *Social Process* are the work of a mind well trained in

[1] Vol. XLIII, No. 2, pp. 127-66, being one of six criticisms on "The Arbitrary as Basis for Rational Morality," by Charner M. Perry.

economics and philosophy as well as sociology. So we here accredit in part to economics those chapters, which are distinguished by their firm grasp of this value concept in both these social sciences and their interrelations.[2]

In economics, as also in philosophy and perhaps in music and graphic art, the idea of value has shown a tendency toward an exclusively positive connotation. In economic discussions it signifies something desirable, namely a "utility," which in turn is a thing or a service "capable of satisfying human wants." A utility in the general sense is, as its name suggests, always useful and, therefore, desirable; which is to say that it is a *positive* value in the generic sense. Economic utilities, or goods, are both desirable and scarce, and it is this combination that makes men willing to give even distasteful effort for them. The economic good is thus defined as a positive value, or desirable object.

While the term "disutility" appears in economic literature, it has not filled a very important place and seems almost incidental. Alfred Marshall's *Principles of Economics* makes no use of it. Although his work was an advanced exposition of neoclassic economic theory, Richard T. Ely's very widely used *Outlines of Economics* likewise presents nothing on "disutility," while it seems to admit that economic values are all positive in the following passage: "Economic wants may be serious, frivolous, or even positively pernicious, but the objects of these wants all alike possess utility in the economic sense." Utility he has already defined as "power to satisfy wants." As utilities they are all good, despite the fact that the wants which they satisfy may be even "pernicious" in some larger frame of social or moral reference. It appears that economic theory thus implicitly defines its values in positive terms only, and so long as it recognizes this limita-

2 Charles H. Cooley, *Social Process* (New York, 1924), Chapters XXV-XXVIII.

tion and stays consistently within it one can have no quarrel with its exponents.

A similar stress upon the positive aspect is characteristic also of *philosophical* reasoning, if we neglect for the moment an exception to be noticed later. The self-imposed limitation in this case springs from the tendency of philosophical, particularly ethical, reasoners to identify *value* with *valuable,* or desirable, and to assume, when not explicitly affirming, that all values are good. This attitude, where not openly expressed in systematic expositions, is often implied in conversations and leads to mutual misunderstanding in academic forums where philosophers and sociologists fraternize. A highly competent philosopher frankly admitted to the writer that he finds the sociological duality quite distasteful to his thought and prefers to use the two terms "values" and "dis-values." This reduces the question to one of terminology and taste, and concerning the matter as thus stated there can be no dispute. However, philosophers who use these two terms, or equivalents, would seem implicitly to recognize that dual aspect of values which has led sociologists to define them as both positive and negative, attractive or repellent. Nevertheless, it is probably correct to say that the majority of philosophers still use the words value and good as equivalent terms.

While it is no part of the present purpose to attempt a historical survey of the practice of philosophers in this matter, we may permissibly set down in passing a few casual observations. For instance, one notes that the eminent Danish philosopher, Harald Höffding, in the translation of his *Problems of Philosophy* "arranged for" by William James, assumes that the "problem of values" is comprised in the twofold aspect of "the ethical problem" and "the religious problem." In this tacit manner he identifies values with the search for "a single pri-

mordial value that determines the values of single instants, periods of life, abilities, and impulses."[3] Yet this limitation closely follows a sentence wherein he remarks that "whatever conduces to satisfaction or supplies a need has worth, or is a good."[4] Five years later, in 1910, the standard *History of Philosophy* by W. Windelbond appeared. This great authority ends his impressive survey with a section entitled "The Problem of Values." At the outset this is taken to be a matter of "ethical considerations," and the position thus tacitly assumed is maintained to the last page.

In like manner the above-cited symposium on "The Arbitrary as Basis for Rational Morality" by C. M. Perry and six collaborators identifies general theory of value with moral value throughout the discussion. It is not unfair to say that we have here the traditional philosophical practice wherein value is identified with good, and particularly with the higher spiritual good. The symposium referred to appeared in the *International Journal of Ethics* in 1933, but the present writer has observed the same identification process in an authoritative college textbook on the history of philosophy, which has appeared since that date. In fact, very recent discussions in private conversation and before two learned societies have found professional philosophers inclined, but not unanimously so, to make use of the term values to indicate only desirable and valuable goals or goods.

If this identification of value with good be essential to the preservation of human faith in the supreme importance of moral and religious values, not to mention those of science and the fine arts, the present writer would be among the first to support that traditional philosophic way of thinking and speaking. But such does not seem to

---

[3] *The Problems of Philosophy* (New York, 1905), p. 158.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 154.

be the case. Even those most zealous to preserve the objectivity and authority of the higher values will recognize that in the realm of morals we have vice as well as virtue, and that religion itself deals with both sin and righteousness, unbelief and faith. Yet in making these admissions, one seems to concede that on every level values are responded to in action as either positive or negative, regardless of any theory on the subject. If there are any serious metaphysical commitments or implications in the positive-negative account now widely prevailing among sociologists, such implications as a professional philosopher would discern, it is much to be desired that such thinkers should be diligent to point out the same. Even if sociologists are free from metaphysical blundering in their growing use of this essentially philosophical value concept, it does, nevertheless, seem unfortunate that the exponents of two disciplines so closely related at certain points should be using the important term values in such divergent ways. Agreement in the definition and use of the term is highly desirable from the point of view of the present writer.

Yet while the divergence is regrettable and even disconcerting, it is hard to resolve. The etymology of the word value is apparently on the side of the philosophical usage. We are told that value means, in the original Latin verb, "to be strong, to be worth." This original meaning remains in the German word *Wert,* signifying "value." So, to speak of negative worth (as in the sociologist's phrase "negative value") seems to be a contradiction in terms. One can think of no worth, or worthlessness, but hardly of worthless worth (negative values), if one holds to the original sense of the word. However, if we refuse to be bound too closely by language roots, and take "worth" as practically equivalent to "meaning" or "significance," the difficulty vanishes. This is apparently

what sociologists, and some philosophers, have done, as will appear in the pages that follow. If the divergence in the use of the word cannot now be undone, perhaps it can be explained, and the fitness or unfitness of the sociological terminology to express the facts of life more closely examined.

However, in making this comparison we have outrun our story, for sociologists have not always occupied their present position. Perhaps it was first taken by Thomas and Znaniecki, in the well-known "Methodological Note" prefacing their celebrated *Polish Peasant* monograph. While the passage in question is not explicit on this point, their definition for a "social value" is "any datum having an empirical content accessible to the members of some social group and a meaning with regard to which it is or may be an object of activity."[5] Reducing this to a brief shorthand expression, we shall here refer to social values as simply *meaningful group-objects;* since they are objects having a common meaning for the members of a group, the said meaning being the outcome of group experience. It is evident that neither the experience nor the meaning need be good or desirable. In fact both may be bad and quite odious without becoming thereby any less truly meaningful group-objects, or values, as defined.

In that great monograph, Professors Thomas and Znaniecki were not interested, it seems, in formal definitions, and merely defined these concepts as working mental tools for a specific piece of research. Moreover, they were dealing with *social* values exclusively. Therefore, they did not raise the issue of negative values explicitly. However, in the well-known passage defining a social value they named only positive, or desirable, values

[5] W. I. Thomas and Florian W. Znaniecki, *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America,* 1918 and 1921, Vol. I, p. 15.

in these words, "Thus, a food-stuff, an instrument, a coin, a piece of poetry, a university, a myth, a scientific theory, are social values."[6] The passage leaves room, however, for the positive and negative aspects in a complementary definition of an *attitude,* as "a process of individual consciousness which determines real or possible activity of the individual in the social world."[7] In this statement the "activity" may be conceived as either favorable or hostile, as Professor Thomas clearly assumes in a later writing wherein he said, "there are also negative values—things which exist but which the individual does not want, which he may even despise."[8] Professors Park and Burgess, pushing the same line of analysis further, pointed out that "the two most elementary patterns are the tendency to approach and the tendency to withdraw."[9]

In the brief passages quoted, these three writers thus enunciated the now current sociological doctrine that approach and withdrawal attitudes define positive and negative social values, respectively. Professor Reuter added a suggestive touch when he said : "An object, whether the contact be sensual or imaginary, may be an object of desire to one group, an object of aversion to a second, and to a third remain indifferent—that is, be not a value at all."[10]

In this and similar passages from other sociological writings, one finds the position clearly taken that values are both positive and negative, and neither exclusively good nor bad in their essence as values. That depends upon the actual content of the specific personal, social, or cosmic situation.

We now turn to that step in philosophy which was ignored for the moment in the preceding account. It was

[6] *Ibid.,* Vol. I, p. 21.
[7] *Ibid.,* p. 22.
[8] In *Suggestions of Modern Science Concerning Education,* by Jennings, Thomas, and others (New York, 1917). Quoted by Robert E. Park and Ernest W. Burgess in *Introduction to the Science of Sociology* (Chicago, 1921), p. 488.
[9] *Ibid.,* p. 439.
[10] Quoted by Bogardus in *Contemporary Sociology* (Los Angeles, 1931), p. 173.

taken simultaneously, it seems, by Professor Wilbur Marshall Urban, of Smith College, in his pioneer volume entitled *Valuation: Its Nature and Laws*, published in 1909, and by Professor Ralph Barton Perry in his vigorous little book, *The Moral Economy*, published in the same year. Professor Urban, in his work, the subtitle of which was "An Introduction to the General Theory of Value," gave American philosophy a new picture of the nature of values and valuation in general, although he did not discuss the question of negative values. Professor Perry, in his monograph, laid down premises which were elaborated two decades later in his systematic presentation, *The General Theory of Value*.[11] In *The Moral Economy* Perry's basic proposition, for what later was to develop into a general theory of value, was that a world without life would be a world without good or bad, "a waste of moral indifference." In our present terminology it would be a world without values. Defining an "interest" as any unit of life which strives constantly to bring itself to maturity, maintain and perpetuate itself, Professor Perry showed how the appearance of such a living thing, even the tiniest mote, would split the indifferent universe of the inert nonliving into two realms. One of these would be all those aspects of environment which were good for the minute unit of life; the other would be all those which were bad for it. As he observed, this dichotomy of the "good-for" and the "bad-for" sets the stage for the moral drama, which, however, begins only when a second "interest" or life-unit appears on the scene. That drama it is not our purpose to consider here, but to call attention to the fact that the moral "stage" of good-for and bad-for described by Professor Perry really also introduced the world of values, in the universal sense.

Perry's interest at that time seemed to lie in setting

11 New York, 1926.

forth an empirical system of ethics, and he did not expand the implications for a general theory of value until many years later, as shown above.

It is easy to see how from these premises there eventually emerged the definition of a value, in most universal terms, as "any object of any interest," as it appears on page 115 of Perry's *General Theory of Value*. On a later page he says, "That which is an object of interest is *eo ipso* invested with value." (p. 137)

Meanwhile, the present writer, building on the premises laid down by Perry in his earlier book and in his classes at Harvard University, but not yet acquainted with his later work or the early book by Urban, had reached similar conclusions and had framed the definitive proposition that *values are the selected objects of living things*. It will be recognized that this is practically equivalent to Professor Perry's definition as finally formulated. But since it was arrived at independently and has been used by the present writer for several years, it may be permissible to retain it here, with acknowledgments to Professor Perry for the original premise and inspiration.

Several years ago, with the growing conception that values in the generic sense are simply the selected objects of living things, the present writer began a series of seminar studies, with graduate students, into the distinctive meaning of social values. The object was to gain a better grasp of their nature, taking present sociological definitions in their commonly accepted sense. But, as the analysis proceeded, it began to appear that sociologists have been calling many things social values which are not logically in that category. This led to the present effort to state the theory of value in terms of life-levels, as will be set forth on the following pages.

It is necessary only to add here that the present statement is the result of a process of elimination, wherein we began with an examination of the term "social values"

as currently used in sociology, disclosed the various levels defined below, and were left with a much reduced content for the original term, as is set forth in its proper place on the pages that follow.

Selective behavior of nonliving things. It would be a risky business to wax dogmatic about the difference between the behavior of living things and that of the nonliving. Very evidently the two are essentially different, but the exact nature of the difference is not so clear. To say that living things *select* certain aspects of their environment while nonliving things do not, very nearly states the situation, if it were not for the selective activities of atoms, molecules, crystals, and colloids. Moreover, all these units manifest *society* in the minimum sense; that is, to a degree which we shall here define as simple *togetherness*. Yet these would seem to be merely striking similarities, or analogies, with the life of the living, and they are accompanied by counterweighting differences. One is that while crystals "grow," they grow by accretion from without and not by metabolic processes from within. Moreover, we know that plants, insects, and even gregarious animals, while living in colonies, swarms, or herds, are really pursuing highly individualistic and solitary lives in spite of their togetherness.[12] Hence, the social life of nonliving entities is very evidently more like our own social life in appearance than it is in fact. Professor Perry rightly began his account of values with the appearance of living things in the hitherto valueless cosmos. In the thought of the present writer, emergent evolution leaped to a new level with the simultaneous arrival of life and values.[13]

[12] Cf. Robert Briffault, "Evolution of Human Species," in *The Making of Man*, by V. F. Calverton, Editor (New York, 1931), p. 761 ff. Reprinted from *Scientia*, June, 1927.

[13] See the *Introduction* by Professor Roy W. Sellars to Bougle's *Evolution of Values* (New York, 1926); also *Emergent Evolution* by C. Lloyd Morgan [New York, 1922 (1931)], and "Emergent Evolution and Some of Its Implications," by H. S. Jennings, reprinted from *Science*, Vol. 65, No. 1672, by the Sociological Press, Hanover, N. H.

Why levels of value arise. We begin at the level of living organisms, then, in our own attempt to identify and define the strictly social values, as distinguished from mere aggregations. Living beings are more or less complex organizations of unstable compounds. They are easily hurt or destroyed. The world around them, organic and inorganic, is friendly to the individual organism in some ways and unfriendly to it in others. These positively friendly or unfriendly things stand out from a vast, dim, and undifferentiated background of things which may become either favorable or unfavorable. The primeval mote of Professor Perry might therefore be said to split the valueless cosmos not only into the realms of the good-for and bad-for, but also the what-for—this last being the indifferent, undefined background from which the other two emerge. Every life is thus a precarious enterprise, a striver biased in its own favor, bent on its own functioning and perpetuation, in a world of inanimate matter which apparently does not "care" for itself, much less for the living beings. Therefore, in order to live at all, every life unit of whatsoever degree of simplicity or complexity must take care, and must select those aspects of the environment which seem good for it or bad for it. These selected objects of living things are values. Life is thus the measure of all values, as Robert Briffault clearly asserted of human beings in his book *The Making of Humanity*. We do not herein imply, however, that human life creates all values, but have in mind also sub-human and superhuman forms of life when we say, with Perry, that in a world without life there could be no good-for and bad-for, no good or bad. All values are the selected objects of living things, approved, rejected, or ignored according to their bearing upon the drives, purposes, or ideals of the living beings. There is thus nothing abstruse or vague about the notion of values in general.

It is as simple as an amoeba's doings at one end of the scale, although at the other end particular values may rise to the grandeur of imperishable dreams, immortal hopes, and the divine far-off event toward which the whole creation moves.

In seeking to determine the levels of value we have to keep constantly in mind the basic truth that values are the selected objects of the evaluators themselves. They are not immediately imposed upon the living being, but are selected by it because of its position on the scale of life. More exactly, the values characteristic of each life-level are those objects which the being selects by virtue of the fact that it participates with living beings at that level. It may or may not be limited to that particular level in all activities of its being. Consequently, the following named levels are neither mutually exclusive nor all inclusive. Those beings, which alone respond on the higher value-levels, at the same time share with humbler beings the values of the lowest levels.

Organic values. Those objects which are sought or avoided by units of life simply because they are organic beings, or living organisms, we shall call organic values. Some such objects selected for avoidance by all organisms are fire and corrosive substances, and heavy, crushing masses. Man and the amoeba are of one mind in this respect because they are both organic beings. They likewise agree in seeking food and drink, air and sunlight, for the same reason. The former group represent negative values of all organisms, the latter are positive values of the same.

Specific values. Specific values are those selected objects which are singled out as favorable or unfavorable by the organism because of the fact that it is a member of a particular species. In other words, specific values are the selected objects of the species. Since each species

of plant or animal inherits a distinctive organic structure and specific tropisms, reflexes, instincts, or drives of some sort, it naturally seeks and avoids different things from those attended to by a different species. As organisms they select the same objects; as species they select divergent objects. Hence, as organisms they compete through *commensalism,* while as species they co-operate by means of *mutualism,* like the partnership between the Honey Badger and the Majumba Bird.[14]

Examples of the above are countless in the world of living beings, as the reader well knows. A hen's bodily structure is characterized by a sharp keeled chest and long centrally dangling legs ending in slim claws. Consequently, a pond of water offers no attractions for her and is, indeed, a negative value, one to be withdrawn from in precipitation. The duck, on the contrary, with her broad breast and short webb-footed legs attached at the rear finds the pond a positive value, to be joyfully approached. Another contrast is seen in the different evaluations placed on bright sunlight by the soaring eagle and the burrowing mole.

Among certain species of ants there are polymorphic subdivisions, as entomologists call them. Thus, in the same hill certain ants, built with powerful backs and legs, show a peculiar interest in dragging leaves home to the hill, but lose interest in the same leaves upon arrival. At the same time certain of their sister ants, possessing large jaws, seem to find a special satisfaction in chopping those very leaves into pieces; while other sisters with small, swiftly moving jaws are bent on mincing the pieces into a fine mulch, which other ants, not, however, specially built, carry to the fungus gardens of the same hill. In this we see how structure helps to determine interest

14 Don H. Selchow, "A Strange Partnership," *Natural History,* December, 1935, pp. 431-37.

and define specific values, down to several distinct varieties within the species. Perhaps the best example of all is that of the doorkeeper ant, with a head larger than his body. This exactly fits the round hole which serves as the entrance to the ant home, situated in this instance within a rotten tree limb. Keeping his head in that hole is a positive value to the doorkeeper ant and seems to be his chief interest in life. If vocational education means getting "a head for one's job," we have here the most perfect example of it.

It is well known that among both ants and bees the division of labor is found between those of similar form as well as among the polymorphic subdivisions. Consequently, the selected objects, or values, whether pollen, wax, or nectar, or leaves, chopped leaves, minced leaves, door opening, or what not, are preferred for functional as well as structural reasons within the species; while the structural alone accounts for the divergence in values between these insects and related forms, such as butterflies, beetles, or grasshoppers. One and the same universe presents very different fields of values to a student poring over his books, a tiny gnat poised on a sunbeam beside him, and a fly who looks upon the scene through six eye-facets while she crawls upside down along the ceiling overhead.

Social values. It needs to be recalled at this point that the basic fact in all our reasoning here is the preferential behavior of the living things themselves. The structure and attitudes of the evaluators define the values on both the levels already described. More than that, we have seen that the necessarily selective behavior of living things is the measure of all values, although not their creator, as far as we can discern them. This being true, we dare not abandon our method of approach when we come now to consider social values, nor may we do so

on any of the other levels of value yet to be defined. The entire pyramid, if we may so liken it, must rest on the same base and possess the symmetry of self-consistent, logical reasoning—and that requires that we continue to approach on each new level from the point of view of the evaluating beings themselves at that level.

This obvious principle need not have been elaborated were it not for the fact that we are forced at this point to define social values with a narrower connotation than is now the practice among American sociologists; and this we have to do for the following reasons.

Upon the present level of social values, we consider *organisms that live in groups.* This, of course, is not true of all living beings. The honeybee lives in highly organized communities, but the bumble bee roams solitary, as do spiders and many insects. Wasps are much more solitary than bees or ants, but have been known to utilize the same corridor for their ruggedly individualistic family dwellings. Lions loaf in pairs, or in small groups of pairs, with their offspring. Grazing and browsing animals, such as cattle, bison, caribou, and antelopes, go in vast herds, wherein individual animals, or mother and young, live individualistically, each following his own nose for grass or leaves, in a multitudinous solitude analogous to that which some have ascribed to the great city.

Now, if we succeed in identifying strictly social values, they will consist of the objects selected by living things not only because they are organisms, nor merely because they are organisms of a certain species, but because they live in groups of two or more. In short, social values are the objects selected by social beings because of the fact that they are social beings. The natural object changes from the merely natural thing to a social value at the point where two or more individuals agree, no matter how tacitly or automatically, upon its meaning. Let us now attempt some examples on this, the social level:

(1) One of these essentially social values is the physical presence of the *associates,* or *socii.* A cow will range for miles in pursuit of grass without paying the least attention to the rest of the herd so long as they are within sight, sound, or smell. But if she wanders inadvertently down a glade, and finally awakens to the fact that the herd has disappeared, her distress is great, as manifested in frantic bawling and rushing around. When she regains the herd, she may, if sufficiently upset, force her way into its midst in order to get the physical "feel" of the associates against her body.

(2) Implied in the above is a second social value: namely, the herd, flock, or *group* in itself.

(3) A third object, favorably selected or sought by social beings, is recognized position, or *status,* in the group. The writer has more than once observed the struggle for status, a goring order and the enforcement of it, among domestic cattle, while the so-called "pecking order" among fowls is the same thing. Similar behavior among other species shows that social animals select social position as a distinct social value.[15] And as every sociologist now knows, most of the time and energy of human beings is spent in the gaining, maintaining, and improving of one's social status.

(4) The *group habitat* may be named as a fourth social value in the strict sense as here defined. Social beings select with peculiar interest the beehive, anthill, or home town as a positive value to be sought, and that of another group as a negative one to be avoided, disparaged, or assailed. At least this is true of the social insects, and it is often true of ignorant, untraveled men.

(5) Perhaps *mutual aid* is a social value also. Kropotkin showed with a great array of evidence that the apparently "happier" life of social animals rests upon

15 Herbert Spencer's chapter on "Ceremonial Societies" in his *Principles of Sociology.*

their recent practice of this kind of behavior. The fact that they select such patterns suggests that it is for them an "interest," as Perry would say it, satisfying a basic "fifth wish," as Bogardus puts it; a positive value in our present phraseology. Whatever the case among animals, we know that mutual aid is a positive social value among human beings in every state of cultural development.

(6) Among human associates, eating and drinking together, or *the common meal,* is a clearly recognized social value of the positive type. It may be an object selected favorably by subhumans also, although one thinks of more instances where it leads to growlings, gorings, clawings, and other combative table manners that mark the common meal as a negative value on the organic level.

(7) With the exception of the last named, all the above social values are positive. *Solitude,* on the other hand, may be mentioned as a negative social value for herd members, perhaps for social insects, and certainly for the vast majority of human beings.

Social-cultural values. Social-cultural values are the selected objects of the members of groups or societies possessing a culture. This is a mode of life that is limited to human beings, in the opinion of most social scientists, although there has been some able and vigorous dissent. That question was discussed with the present writer by Hart, Pantzer, and Bain in earlier issues of the *American Journal of Sociology,* and it need not be reargued here.[16] Just now we must attempt some brief statement of the essential characteristics of culture, in order to define, or at least illustrate, cultural values more clearly. Ward laid a firm foundation when he explained civilization (culture in our phraseology) as the sum total of achievement, and achievement as ways and means of modifying

[16] Vol. XXX, No. 6 (May, 1925); Vol. XXXII, No. 6 (May, 1927); also *Sociology and Social Research,* Vol. XIII (July-August, 1929).

environment by tools and symbols, the knowledge of which is transmitted purely by tradition, especially through the process of democratic education.[17]

This is just about the sum of the matter, yet Elwood and others improved it by setting forth very ably and explicitly the great role of *language* in the organization and transmission of culture;[18] while Bernard contributed some extremely illuminating ideas when he referred to "the external storage of internal habit systems," and spoke of this as "symbolic behavior."[19] The preceding, with the addition of Wissler's "Universal Culture Scheme" (speech, material traits, art, mythology and scientific knowledge, religious practices, family and social systems, property, government, and war), gives a rather definite notion as to what we here mean by the term "culture."[20]

As defined for the purpose of the present paper, culture is whatsoever man (or any other creature) learns as a member of society, stores externally in tools and symbols, and transmits socially as culture patterns, in their twofold aspect of social values, with corresponding attitudes in persons, plus such products as endure through "the sheer objective continuity of material existence."[21] Cultural values are the objects which living social beings select to seek or avoid, not merely because they are social but because they are members of a group that possesses an accumulating stream of socially transmitted symbolic behavior, as above described.

This kind of behavior is shown by the available evidence to hold only for human beings, with some frag-

17 *Pure Sociology,* Chapter III; *Applied Sociology,* Chapter XII.

18 Charles A. Elwood, "Theories of Cultural Evolution," *American Journal of Sociology,* Vol. XXIII, No. 6 (May, 1918).

19 L. L. Bernard, "The Classification of Culture," *Journal of Sociology and Social Research,* Vol. XV, No. 3 (Jan.-Feb., 1931).

20 Clark Wissler, *Man and Culture* (New York, 1923), Chapters IV and V.

21 Cf. A. F. Goldenweiser, *Early Civilization* (New York, 1922), p. 17, for the quoted phrase.

mentary and shadowy suggestions among insects, spiders, and apes. Therefore, our discussion of the present level, and also the next one, may be understood as referring specifically to human beings, the present writer's investigations of a rather large body of evidence having shown that the fact proves insufficient to warrant its extension.

The first fact to arrest attention here is that it is in his cultural life rather than his social traits that man is more richly equipped than are subhuman creatures. This holds true, apparently, for both community organization and individual social traits. As for organization, we see that in the elaborate societies of ants and bees man is rivaled if not outdone. Indeed the present drift toward regimentation in dictatorial nations today has been interpreted explicitly by some as a movement toward the life-plan of the social insects. Of one thing we may be certain: namely, that in the ruthless regimentation of the anthill and beehive we see a perfect model for the so-called "efficient," "totalitarian" society.

When it comes to certain basic social attitudes, the behavior of the subhuman creatures is amazing in many instances. The self-sacrificing affection of the mother for her offspring loses nothing as we descend the scale of mammalian life, as every observer of domestic animals knows. The affection of the little chimpanzee, Gua, that Professor and Mrs. Kellogg experimentally "adopted" and treated exactly as they did their infant son Donald, could hardly be counted as less than human in its warmth and definiteness of affectionate expression toward its little human playmate.[22]

This same young ape also expressed most remarkably definite attitudes of approach and withdrawal, or social distance, with reference to different persons who had shown various degrees of sympathy, understanding, and

[22] Winthrop Niles Kellogg and Luella Kellogg, *The Ape and the Child: A Study of Environmental Influence Upon Early Behavior* (New York, 1933).

tactful bearing in their dealings with it. This expression varied from a long, warm handclasp to a hesitating approach and a greeting so brief that it amounted merely to a quick slap of the palm and a swift leap backward at the same instant. This fine social intelligence was not matched by cultural facility, since, as the experimenters say, she was *only an ape* in the end.

The fascinating account of beaver traits given by the Indian ex-trapper and warden, Grey Owl, in his book, *Pilgrims of the Wild*,[23] shows these creatures as being extraordinarily "human" in their affection for one another and also for Grey Owl and his Iroquois wife. All this, and much additional evidence, is sufficient to show that in strictly social traits mankind does not rate so much beyond the so-called brutes as is often assumed. His superiority lies in his cultural rather than his social development.

However, the distinction between the social and the cultural is not clearly discernible at this point, particularly when we pause to consider the origin of the thing which is called "human nature." Its leading expositor, Professor Cooley, described it as

a social nature developed in man by simple forms of intimate association or "primary groups," especially the family and neighborhood, which are found everywhere and everywhere work upon the individual in somewhat the same way. This nature consists chiefly of certain primary social sentiments and attitudes, such as consciousness of one's self in relation to others, love of approbation, resentment of censure, emulation, and a sense of social right and wrong formed by the standards of a group.[24]

These traits, particularly the last two, are distinctively human. Professor Cooley so regarded them, as shown by the fact that he spoke of these human nature sentiments and impulses as human "in being superior to those of

23 Wa-Sha-Quon-Asin (Grey Owl), *Pilgrims of the Wild* (New York, 1935).
24 Charles H. Cooley, *Human Nature and the Social Order* (New York, 1902; revised edition, 1922), p. 32.

lower animals," yet "not something existing separately in the individual, but a *group-nature or primary phase of society*. . . . Man does not have it by birth; he cannot acquire it except through fellowship, and it decays in isolation. . . the family and neighborhood life is essential to its genesis and nothing more is."[25] Thus, it seems that human nature as defined by Cooley turns out to be not only social but cultural, and man's superiority in social traits, whatever its degree, is tied up inextricably with his cultural experience.

In view of the above and other considerations already mentioned, the second thing to be noted in the present discussion is that the values which recent sociology has been calling "social" are often really cultural values. That is to say, an instrument, a coin, a piece of poetry, a university, a myth, a scientific theory are all things that man has learned as a member of society. The only remaining one of this famous list of examples from Thomas and Znaniecki is foodstuffs. They may include a simple organic value such as a meaty bone, a strictly social value such as the queen's honey or jelly fed by her bodyguard to a queen bee, or a cultural value such as "Mellin's Food." The other objects in the above list all imply conceptual or symbolic thinking, which is really abstract thinking and particular to mankind, so far as we know. We do know, at any rate, that animals have no coins, universities, myths, or theories.

At the same time we do not overlook the fact, acknowledged above where we spoke of social values as meaningful group-objects, that all cultural objects are the outcome of social or group experience, as Professor Thomas so clearly showed. Therefore, it might be better to speak of such collectively selected and meaningful group-ob-

25 Charles H. Cooley, *Social Organization* (New York, 1915), pp. 28, 29, 30-31.

jects as social-cultural values. We should then have the strictly social values named in the preceding section and common to man and subhuman social cultures, and the social-cultural values peculiar to man.

Social-cultural values are likewise the only ones, naturally, named by Wissler in his "universal culture scheme." The list is, as he states, merely suggestive and schematic. The number of social-cultural values is beyond enumeration. Even the gigantic catalogue of a great mail-order house represents only part of the wealth of material objects known to Occidental culture, and material objects make up only one ninth of Wissler's culture scheme. Against this bewildering multiplicity of social-cultural values stands the list of seven strictly social values presented above. That meager showing perhaps expresses merely the present writer's ignorance. In any event there seems to be a good opportunity for some systematic research along this line within the field of animal sociology. And let us say, in passing, that animal sociology will be found to be extremely simple in all instances. For example, Vernon Kellogg has shown that the key to insect societies is the existence of neuters, that prevent overpopulation by working without reproducing.[26] The social life of apes as described by Zuckerman would seem, to the present writer, to simmer down to the seasonal mating impulse, mother-love, and hair.[27] The last named is a leading value among these apes, who dote on picking the fur of their associates and having their own picked—not primarily for vermin, as some have supposed.

These illustrations are given here to show that the merely social groups may be explained in very simple,

---

[26] Cf. Vernon Kellogg, "Insect Sociology," *The Scientific Monthly*, Vol. **XXI**, September, 1925.

[27] Cf. S. Zuckerman, *The Social Life of Monkeys and Apes* (New York, 1932), p. 58 ff.

physical terms, while the social-cultural groups peculiar to human beings live a life immeasurably more complex in its manifestations and also its explanation. Consequently, plant, insect, and animal sociology all differ generically from human sociology in form, and even more so in content. No one seriously questions this, despite the fact that some of us, in superacademic moments, argue solemnly about it.

Personal values.   Personal values are the objects selected by a person as such, that is as an individual who has integrated his own experiences and acquired his social status, high or low, within certain culture groups. The word *person* means to us two things. First, the person, as personality, is the spiritual self of Eubank.[28] So regarded, it is that unfathomed entity which holds memories and formulates purposes. It is the integrating center of all the experiences of the individual. In the suggestive phrase of Korzybski and his associates, it is the "time-binder." For the present writer this signifies the living thing *for which time counts* by registering impressions, and funding them as attitudes and habits. As a time-binder it thus picks up its own past and carries it within itself through the present into the future. In so doing this time-binder, memory-holder, experience-haver, status-seeker, ideal-cherisher remains always the same, yet forever changing—a paradox which only personality can resolve, as Professors Bowne and Flewelling have shown.[29] In so doing, it comes to select certain objects just because of its own private experience in the past. Thus one person may enjoy pleasant recollections when certain musical strains are played because so conditioned to them by a happy experience of the distant school days;

[28] Earle Edward Eubank, *The Concepts of Sociology* (New York, 1932), pp. 103-6.

[29] Ralph Tyler Flewelling, *Personalism and the Problems of Philosophy* (New York, 1915), pp. 134-35, and 184.

and it is therefore a positive value for him. Another may respond in precisely the opposite way as a result of an unpleasant setting in his past for the same strains, making it for him a negative value. Both life and literature are full of illustrations of this power of private, unique experience to create a set of personal values.

At the same time, the person is an individual who has attained recognized position, or status, in various groups, large and small. As Eubank ably shows,[30] the person is the "situation self," which varies from situation to situation as the person plays his different roles. Thus the social context is also registered in his approaches and withdrawals with reference to the various objects, material and immaterial. Yet at the same time, as Eubank also shows, the personality, or spiritual self, maintains its identity and integrates the whole stream of experience.

In the light of the above considerations, it seems that personal values fall midway between organic and specific values, both of which are defined by the individual organism, and the social and cultural values, especially the latter, which are determined by the group. Personal values, in other words, are primarily, even uniquely, individual selections, but are socially conditioned in their origin.

This is the proper point to recognize that there are those who are inclined to distinguish a level of individual values. To the present writer it seems, at this time, that individuality is simply that degree of difference, distinctness, or uniqueness which is found among living beings at every level of life. Any creature born with peculiar development, for better or worse, of any organ, reacts in a way not quite the same as do its normal companions. This may cause it to select the same objects in a different way, which would be an expression of its individuality

[30] *Op. cit.,* pp. 106-10.

but would not create a new level of values. Such variations run throughout the living world, expressing themselves most markedly along both mental and physical lines at the level of human personality. However, in the present thought of the writer, there would seem to be no such thing as a level of individual values. Distinctness, or individual uniqueness, is an aspect of life at every level of values from the lowest to the highest, and values of any level may take on a shade of difference because of this individual characteristic of the evaluator, which is to say, the actor. Moral and spiritual values are provided for amply, it would seem, under our account of the social-cultural and personal levels of value, without the necessity of introducing a distinct level of "individual" values.

A scale of social-cultural values.   Our final level in this account was that of social-cultural values, and, like all other values, they are found to be both positive and negative, that is, good or bad. This duality is in itself sufficient to reassure any reader who might fear that our reasoning will reduce all values to a dead level. On the contrary we have not even touched a very important remaining problem, perhaps the most important, which is the construction of a scale for rating the multitude of social-cultural values, especially those of the positive, desirable type, which we pronounce good. This, however, may be the special task of philosophy and ethics, if we include social ethics and social philosophy, both of which are highly important, as Simmel so ably showed.[31] All that need be added here is to suggest that a scale might be based upon such characteristics as imperativeness, universality, and inclusiveness—with the addition, of course, of such other criteria as might be found appropriate; for example:

[31] Nicholas J. Spykman, *The Social Theory of Georg Simmel* (Chicago, 1925), Chapter IV.

Imperativeness. Certain values are absolutely imperative, such as the demand of all organisms for air to breathe, even if it be the air found in the waters where myriads of creatures swim. The Black Hole of Calcutta is the supreme example of this in human history. Next to air come food and drink, to which list other especially imperative values might be added by competent investigators. They would find a fine body of material and reasoning in the "man-land ratio" of Sumner and Keller.[32] "The first task of life is to live," as Sumner says in his *Folkways*. This does not, of course, imply that it is the highest task, but the most imperative, except with those heroic martyrs who sacrifice life itself to even higher values.

Universality. This category overlaps the preceding in one aspect, but is differentiated by the fact that it is here meant to denote also the range of appeal to the possessors of cultural life or, in a word, to mankind. Here the well-known discussion in Cooley's *Social Process* on "human nature values" and "institutional values" affords a fine illustration. The same may be said of the more recent "common-human" and "circumscribed" relations of Von Wiese and Becker's *Systematic Sociology*. Universality of appeal is not exactly the same as imperativeness, since we here deal with things that are not absolutely necessary for the physical existence. However, fair play may be found, in the end, to be equally necessary for the social life. Indeed, before the World War it was apparently so rated, and one of the greatest evils of that conflict was the weakening of regard for fair play and chivalry among millions. And this was not by any means limited to those at the front. It may be that courage still holds its appeal and might be named as another example of a more nearly universal social-cultural value.

[32] William G. Sumner and Albert G. Keller, *The Science of Society* (New Haven and London, 1927), Vol. I, Chapter II.

Inclusiveness. Professor Perry did a fine piece of work along this line in *The Moral Economy*. In fact, his table, called "The Order of Virtue," is worked out upon the test of inclusiveness. That is morally better, in his analysis, which more fully preserves and enhances life in a more inclusive way. This is true, he finds, not because it is larger, but because it includes itself, plus other interests of the same kind. Thus, in a conflict of claims between the individual and his family, the family takes precedence, provided it be a true family, since it then includes the interests of all its members, not excepting the one who conflicts in this case. After the same reasoning, the family should yield to the community, provided it be a true community, which then includes the welfare of that particular family plus that of all the other families. And so on, upward through the commonwealth, nation, and internation, or humanity at large. On Perry's scale, religion stands at the top, as it should, because its "value" is "the universal system of interests," realized through the virtue called "good-will." Durkheim's division of all values into the secular and the sacred[33] supports this view; and likewise, Lowie's dichotomy of the "ordinary" and the "extraordinary." Still earlier, King, in his penetrating study, *The Development of Religion,* showed clearly that religious values are necessarily, for psychological reasons, the most transcendent values.[34] Indeed, if religion did not fill this role, it would not be religion, which is precisely the organization of the higher values of any social-cultural group, or man's completest response to his biggest world. And, as shown above, the religious values are "higher" because, for one thing, they are more inclusive, in the temporal as well as the spatial

[33] Emile Durkheim, *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life* (London and New York, 1915); Robert H. Lowie, *Primitive Religion* (New York, 1924).

[34] Irving King, *The Development of Religion: A Study in Anthropology and Social Psychology* (New York, 1910), Chapters IV and V, *passim.*

dimensions. Professor Urban, in his article on "Value" in the Encyclopaedia Britannica, writes as follows in raising the question of an ultimate standard of values:

> In general such a standard is found in the notion of *inclusiveness,* in some functional conception such as the totality of life or experience, that value being highest which contributes most to the coherent functioning and organization of experience as a whole. Such a standard may be formulated in terms that seem to avoid metaphysical implications, but in general it may be said that the highness or lowness of an experience of value is held to be determined by its metaphysical content. From this point of view a very common table or scale of values is that which puts the economic values as the lowest and the religious (in the broadest sense) as the highest, the ethical, the logical, and the aesthetic being arranged in various ways in between.

The ancient division of the higher social-cultural values into the three categories of the *true,* the *beautiful,* and the *good* has been approved by numerous modern thinkers as perhaps most satisfactory, and some very properly include as a fourth, the *useful.*

Upon this basis we should then have the useful in the three aspects of the most imperative, the most universal, and the most inclusive, making likewise this threefold differentiation under each of the other three categories. Finally, there should be mentioned Dean Small's "health, wealth, sociability, knowledge, beauty, and rightness." In this there is an expansion of the four categories named above, under a twofold progression, namely, from the more egoistic to the more altruistic, and from the more material values to the more spiritual.

VERBAL STEREOTYPES AND SOCIAL CONTROL

READ BAIN

Miami University, Oxford, Ohio

The relation between verbal and overt behavior is of paramount importance to both sociological method and theory. In a sense, of course, verbation[1] is as overt, i.e., as observable, as other behavior, but people frequently *say* they think, feel, believe, or will do one thing, and then proceed to act very differently. Therefore, the distinction between verbation and action is necessary. Reification, rationalization, stereotypy, figures of speech, courtesy and other diplomatic representations, forgetting, and plain lying are some of the "diseases of language" that produce the hiatus between verbation and action. Perhaps to these should be added the faults of communication incident to the poor definition and differential emotional connotation of words. People who use the same words never mean exactly the same thing, but their actions proceed more or less automatically as a result of past conditioning and habituation. Verbation is also action, but it is a mediatory, symbolic action, referring to the qualities and/or movements of sensed or imagined objects, or to the relations between them. In general, one can tell more nearly what people are doing, and sometimes what they will do in the future, by watching them than by listening to what they say either before or after they have acted.

The implications of these remarks are obvious to anyone who regards sociology as a natural science. Verbation can be studied as a natural phenomenon from many points

---

[1] I first used this neologism in "An Attitude on Attitude Research," *American Journal of Sociology*, p. 945, May, 1928. It seems better to me than such awkward equivalents as "verbal behavior" and "verbatization."

of view. Such study may be highly significant for sociology and the other social sciences,—but only when it is correlated with observable adjustive and nonadjustive nonverbal behavior. This also implies that language behavior is *ex post facto* with reference to nonverbal behavior. Babies squirm and vocalize before they talk, and we may infer that the animal that became human made overt nonverbal adjustments, including vocalization, long before it made symbolic sounds and thus became a language-using, that is, a *human,* animal. It also implies that in most of our behavior, action precedes thinking or verbation. We customarily act and then attempt to justify, or "explain," our action by words. This is one of the many difficulties which afflict the means-ends schemata now burgeoning so lushly in sociological literature. Only relatively late in human history have people been able to think before they speak and speak before they act. Most of us still do it rather infrequently and with rather indifferent success. Language behavior might almost be called a societal epiphenomenon, a form of oral hyperkinaesthesia, or, in "Chasian" lingo, a kind of chronic and acute but highly contagious "Blabitis." In Pareto's terms, it is largely nonlogical derivation, though probably derivative from action and its emotional correlates rather than from the (to me) more or less ill-defined and speculative residues.

Another implication of this position is that technological devices and the skills and habits associated with them are powerful factors in the creation of speech habits. Men often make a machine or gadget, write a book or paper, and then name it. In any case, the name has no public meaning until the device has been used by numerous people. Furthermore, whenever a new technological culture complex develops, corresponding verbal habits appear that symbolize the cultural compulsives created

by the technological devices and skills. Thus, the so-called material and nonmaterial culture traits comprise an organic unity, neither having social meaning without the other. Even highly abstract words like "gods," "states," and "homes" always have numerous material and technological correlates, such as idols, crosses, and temples; flags, seals, warships, forts, and buildings; rings, furniture, utensils, and dwellings. In the case of highly abstract symbols, such as mathematical formulas, there are the material sensory symbols themselves, the instruments with which they are made, and the recording culture complex, such as clay tablets, steles, and books. *Homo faber* precedes and implements *homo locutor*.

The folk sayings of people may be regarded as a kind of protoscience. They represent naïve generalizations about man's adjustment to his physical, biological, and cultural environment. Many of them are derived from experience with technological devices, e.g., "A stitch in time saves nine," "A chain is as strong as its weakest link." Others are based directly upon sense experience with physical and biological objects, e.g., "All is not gold that glitters," "Blood is thicker than water." Some, stemming directly from social experience, are designed to promote certain values and ideals, e.g., "A friend in need is a friend indeed," "Actions speak louder than words." The latter would make a good slogan for this paper.

Proverbs frequently have marked emotional overtones and are expressive of an implicit or explicit philosophy of life, or set of values. Obviously, such a philosophy is full of contradictions and inconsistencies, since almost every proverb has its logical antithesis and most proverbs are partial truths at best and sheer nonsense at worst. It is difficult to tell whether people act because they believe in proverbs or merely cite proverbs to explain and justify their action. It is clear that behavior may be conditioned

by proverbs and slogans, even when the actor regards the stereotype as doubtful if not ridiculous. Advertisers, politicians, preachers, and promoters know this. It is possible that these verbal patterns may be the societal reality out of which public opinion arises. The "change in the intellectual and emotional climate" of which literary social scientists frequently speak may be due to the technologically mediated changes in simple adjustmental habits of acting and feeling which in turn mediate changes in verbal derivations. These become stereotyped in proverbs, slogans, clichés, "wisecracks," and other forms of easily communicable verbation, to which and through which appeals may be made, with resultant more or less "conscious" and pseudorational changes in overt behavior.

Stereotypical verbation is, first of all, a reflexive type of behavior derived from actual overt adjustment to physical, biological, and social objects; second, it becomes the mediating means by which other ways of acting and feeling gain acceptance. A proposal opposed to one's active emotionalized stereotypes tends to be rejected; if it is, or seems to be, consistent with them, it tends to be accepted. If this is true, these phenomena are basic to public opinion, to change in thoughtways and modes of feeling, and, hence, to the whole question of social control. Thus far, very little scientific sociological research has been done on proverbs and similar stereotypes. Bogardus and Hertzler have shown their importance for social thought, and Albig has published at least one study. A great deal of such material has been collected by literary men, anthropologists, and others, and would seem to merit intensive sociological analysis.

If the general theory stated above is correct, it follows that technological and scientific changes will destroy some proverbs and create others, i.e., new stereotypical verbation will appear as a result of new technoscientific

ways of acting and feeling, and, having appeared, will exert a reciprocal influence on subsequent behavior. It should never be forgotten, however, that certain verbal stereotypes may remain in the culture long after the overt behavior or theory of things which created them has been replaced. In such cases, we have people speaking in one way and acting differently; giving lip-service to old ways but acting in accordance with present technological and culturally coercive imperatives.

In an effort to study some of the implications of this theoretical position, the following investigation was undertaken. We asked 133 freshmen to write down all the proverbs they could and mark them $+$, $-$, and $\pm$ for "True," "False," and "Doubtful" or "Partially True." "Honesty is the best policy" was given as an example. They also wrote all the "common sayings," "wisecracks," and "slang phrases" they could that had a mechanical reference. Examples: "He has a screw loose," "Wheels in his head," "He's a flat tire." Age, sex, rural or urban residence (towns of 1,500 or less were counted as rural), and possession of car, radio, electric washer, electric sweeper, and sewing machine were also indicated. One hour was allowed in class; so there was no possibility of "looking up" either proverbs or mechanical clichés. The methodological reasons for this procedure as well as the methodological problems of handling data so collected are discussed somewhat fully in one of my previous papers.[2]

Table I gives the general results differentiated by sex. The males gave 4.2 more mechanical clichés than the females on the average and slightly more proverbs. The

---

[2] Read Bain, "Changed Beliefs of College Students," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, April-June, 1936, pp. 1-11. In the present study, Paul Tappan assisted in the collection of the materials and, with W. F. Cottrell, A. T. Hansen, Ruth Hill, Florence Bain, Bernice Brubaker, and William Kolb, in the problems of classification. Miss Hill, Miss Brubaker, Mr. Kolb, and the author did the tabulating.

TABLE I

NUMBER AND AVERAGE OF MECHANICAL CLICHÉS AND PROVERBS
GIVEN BY 133 COLLEGE FRESHMEN, BY SEX, 1937

ITEMS	52 Males		81 Females		133 Total M and F	
	Number	Average	Number	Average	Number	Average
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
1. Mech. Clichés	980	18.8	1,180	14.6	2,160	16.2
2. Proverbs	1,458	28.0	2,196	27.1	3,654	27.5
3. True	729	14.0	1,240	15.3	1,969	14.8
4. False	298	5.7	314	3.9	612	4.6
5. Doubtful or partly true	409	7.9	586	7.2	995	7.5
6. Not stated	22	....	56	....	78	....

males were not so credulous as the females regarding the truth of proverbs. The males thought more of them were false and doubted the truth of the remainder, or regarded them as only partially true, to a greater extent than did the females.

Table II gives a more intensive analysis of the opinions as to truth and falsity of the proverbs, both by sex and residence. The rural male average for "True" proverbs was higher than that of the females, but the female percentage was considerably higher. The male percentage for "False" was much higher than the female percentage, while the female percentage for "Doubtful" slightly exceeded the male. For the urban males and females, the same general pattern was found, except that the urban students were considerably more critical of the truth of proverbs.[3]

[3] When urban and rural classes are compared irrespective of sex, the urban class has a lower average and percentage for "True," slightly lower for "False," and a larger percentage for "Doubtful." So it looks as if the males are more critical of proverbs than the females; urban males, than rural males; urban females, than rural females; and urban males and females are more critical than rural males and females. Rural males show a higher percentage "False" than urban females and therefore seem more critical, but the "True" percentages are about the same and the urban females exceed the rural males in the percentage "Doubtful."

TABLE II

AVERAGE AND PERCENTAGE OF TRUE, FALSE, AND DOUBTFUL PROVERBS GIVEN BY 133 COLLEGE FRESHMEN, 1937, CLASSIFIED BY SEX AND RESIDENCE*

PROVERBS	25 Rural				108 Urban				Total R and U			
	8 Male		17 Female		44 Male		64 Female		25 Rural		108 Urban	
	Av.	Pct.	Av.	Pct.	Av.	Pct.	Av.	Pct.	Av.	Pct.	Av.	Pct.
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)
1. True	19.0	54.9	17.5	60.3	13.1	48.9	14.7	55.3	17.0	58.4	14.1	52.7
2. False	7.9	22.7	3.9	13.6	5.3	19.9	3.9	14.5	5.2	16.9	4.0	16.7
3. Doubtful or partly true	8.0	23.1	7.4	25.5	7.8	29.2	7.2	27.0	7.6	24.6	7.5	27.9

TABLE III

NUMBER AND AVERAGE OF MECHANICAL CLICHÉS AND PROVERBS GIVEN BY 133 COLLEGE FRESHMEN, 1937, CLASSIFIED BY SEX AND RESIDENCE

CLASSES OF ITEMS	25 Rural				108 Urban				Total R and U			
	8 Male		17 Female		44 Male		64 Female		25 Rural		108 Urban	
	No.	Av.	No.	Av.	No.	Av.	No.	Av.	No.	Av.	No.	Av.
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)
Mech. Clichés	117	14.6	182	14.2	863	19.6	998	15.3	299	12.0	1,861	17.2
Proverbs	277	34.6	494	29.0	1,181	26.8	1,702	26.6	771	30.8	2,883	26.7

* The rural males judged 152 proverbs to be true; 63, false; 64, doubtful. The corresponding figures for the rural females were 298, 67, 126; urban males, 577, 235, 345; urban females, 942, 247, 460. Percentages are based on number of proverbs given in each category (see Table III, line 2, columns 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12). These figures include those "not stated," of course, which slightly reduces the percentages; the averages are accurate.

Table III compares the average number of mechanical clichés and proverbs given by rural males and females, urban males and females, and rural and urban students as a class. Rural males exceeded females slightly in cliché average, and rather markedly in proverb average. The urban males exceeded the urban females by 4.3 in clichés and only slightly in proverbs, but the urban males and females greatly exceeded the rural males and females in cliché knowledge, and were exceeded by the latter rather definitely in proverb knowledge. The whole urban class exceeded the rural class strongly by 5.2 on cliché

TABLE IV

CLASSIFICATION OF MECHANICAL CLICHÉS GIVEN BY 133 COLLEGE
FRESHMEN, 1937, BY SEX AND RESIDENCE, WITH AVERAGES
IN EACH CATEGORY

CLASSIFICATION	25 Rural			108 Urban			133 M and F		
	8M	17F	Av.	44M	64F	Av.	52M	81F	Av.
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
1. Beauty	12	14	1.04	68	90	1.95	80	104	1.33
2. Brightness	30	41	2.84	188	206	4.86	218	247	3.50
3. Conformity	3	5	.32	11	14	.31	14	19	.25
4. Co-operation	3	3	.24	14	13	.33	17	16	.25
5. Decision	0	0	.00	4	9	.16	4	9	.10
6. Efficiency	10	8	.72	58	28	1.06	68	36	.78
7. Energy	2	2	.16	23	27	.62	25	29	.41
8. Honesty	5	3	.32	20	9	.36	25	12	.28
9. Likableness	7	27	1.36	67	126	2.38	74	153	1.70
10. Love	0	3	.12	12	27	.48	12	30	.32
11. Modernity	0	1	.04	6	19	.31	6	20	.20
12. Modesty	0	4	.16	31	34	.80	31	38	.41
13. Self-control	6	18	.96	60	78	1.70	66	96	1.22
14. Self-reliance	1	0	.04	9	10	.23	10	10	.15
15. Skill	3	2	.20	13	8	.26	16	10	.20
16. Speed	5	16	.84	78	88	2.05	83	104	1.40
17. Strength	12	6	.72	69	41	1.36	81	47	.96
18. Neutral Ref.	18	29	1.88	132	171	3.74	150	200	2.63
Total	117	182	12.00	863	998	17.20	980	1,180	16.20

and were exceeded by the latter on the proverb average by 4.1. This indicates that the rural students have been less influenced by mechanical verbation than the urban students, and that the males have been influenced more

TABLE V

CLASSIFICATION OF PROVERBS GIVEN BY 133 COLLEGE FRESHMEN, 1937, BY SEX AND RESIDENCE, WITH AVERAGES FOR EACH CATEGORY

CLASSIFICATION	25 Rural			108 Urban			133 M and F		
	8M	17F	Av.	44M	64F	Av.	52M	81F	Av.
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
1. Association	1	12	.52	22	33	.68	23	45	.51
2. Co-operation	3	7	.40	15	18	.41	18	25	.32
3. Family	8	4	.48	16	39	.68	24	43	.50
4. Friendship	8	8	.64	12	20	.40	20	28	.36
5. Habit	6	6	.48	7	27	.42	13	33	.34
6. Health-Cleanliness	5	13	.72	38	45	1.02	43	58	.71
7. Honesty	7	15	.88	30	24	.67	37	39	.57
8. In-Out Group	0	1	.04	4	3	.08	4	4	.06
9. Justice	11	12	.92	41	66	1.32	52	78	.98
10. Love	7	26	1.32	59	84	1.76	66	110	1.32
11. Moderation	12	18	1.20	30	61	1.12	42	79	.91
12. Modesty	2	7	.36	14	29	.53	16	36	.39
13. Nature of Man	25	27	2.08	92	118	2.59	117	145	1.22
14. Nature of World	41	71	4.48	134	211	4.26	175	282	3.44
15. Novelty	3	8	.44	25	25	.62	28	33	.46
16. Persistence	36	58	3.76	119	159	3.43	155	217	2.79
17. Prudence	17	59	3.04	141	227	4.54	158	286	3.34
18. Reality-Appearance	15	19	1.36	56	86	1.75	71	105	1.33
19. Resignation	14	34	1.92	101	138	2.95	115	172	2.15
20. Self-reliance	17	26	1.72	82	92	2.15	99	118	1.63
21. Sympathy	14	25	1.16	41	57	1.21	55	82	1.03
22. Thrift	9	11	.80	43	40	1.02	52	51	.77
23. Wisdom	16	26	1.68	54	83	1.70	70	109	1.35
24. Reputation	0	1	.04	5	17	.27	5	18	.17
TOTAL	277	494	30.80	1,181	1,702	26.70	1,458	2,196	27.50

than the females, especially in urban areas. There is little difference in familiarity with proverbs as between sexes in city and country, except that both rural males and females have higher proverb averages than urban males and females and the total rural exceeds the total urban rather noticeably on this point.

Tables IV and V give the distributions of clichés and proverbs and the averages of the clichés and proverbs given by rural and urban students in each category of the two classifications. We tried to develop a classification that could be used for both sets of data but found it impossible. Some of the headings are more or less similar, however, and if the breakdown had not reduced the numbers so much, perhaps some differences as between males and females, rural and urban, might be shown. For example, Co-operation, Honesty, Love, and Modesty appear in both tables, and Modernity-Novelty, Self-reliance-Persistence, Self-control-Prudence, and Conformity-Resignation are somewhat similar.[4]

[4] However, in Table IV the urban averages are twice as great or more for clichés referring to Beauty, Brightness (intelligence, smartness, et cetera), Energy, Love, Modernity, Modesty, Self-reliance, and Speed. The rural students, comparatively, were more given to clichés related to Conformity, Co-operation, Honesty, and Skill than were the urban students, although the rural averages were less in all categories. Averages were not computed for sexes, but columns 8 and 9, Table IV, show that males gave many more clichés, comparatively, relating to Brightness, Efficiency, Honesty, Skill, Speed, and Strength. The females gave more, comparatively, pertaining to Decision, Likableness, Love, and Modernity.

In Table V, the urban averages exceeded the rural on proverbs pertaining to Association, Family, Health-Cleanliness, Justice, Love, Modesty, Nature of Man, Novelty, Prudence, Reality-Appearance, Resignation, Self-reliance, Sympathy, Thrift, and Reputation, but only on Resignation, Self-reliance, and Reputation were the urban averages double the rural or more. The averages for sexes were not computed, but columns 6 and 9, Table V, show that the males gave more proverbs, comparatively, pertaining to Honesty, Novelty, Self-reliance, and Thrift, while the females exceeded markedly in those pertaining to Family, Habit, Moderation, Modesty, and Reputation.

We hoped that having the students indicate some of the technological equipment in the home would give a basis for some comparisons between these factors and the mechanical clichés and proverbs, but almost all of them, males and females, urban and rural, had all of the items designated. The whole 133 had radios; all but 8, sewing machines; all but 6, electric sweepers; all but 23, electric washers; and all but 16, automobiles. All the rural students except one had cars. So this part of the study came to nothing except to show that the sample was highly homogeneous as far as this equipment is concerned.

It was also highly homogeneous as to chronological age, all but 21 being either 18 or 19 years old; all were white and almost all native born for two or

The ideal way to collect data of this sort would be to allow a specified time for proverbs and clichés each and then get enough cases so that one could match at least 50 rural and urban males and females, giving 200 cases matched for age, education, race, nativity, socioeconomic status, intelligence, and perhaps other variables, such as scores on a test for familiarity with mechanical objects and principles. Then the two variables, sex and residence, would be thrown into relief. The same could be done for the other contained variables.

If this was done, however, the difficult problem of classification and tabulation would still remain. From our experience with such data in the paper referred to, as well as with these, I believe this is not an insuperable difficulty. We first made a random selection of 100 proverbs out of the 3,654 given and then made a tentative list of categories by inspection and "intuition." Then we classified the sample. This revealed several inadequacies in the trial categories which were remedied after several trials and resulted in the categories of Table V. We next made a list of 8 or 10 "typical" proverbs under each heading to guide us in classifying. Then we took another sam-

---

more generations. We may assume that it was fairly homogeneous as to educational achievement, since all were college freshmen. They were probably more homogeneous as to measured intelligence than the general average of the university, since there were more than twice as many in the two upper deciles as in the two lower. Over 30 per cent were in the two upper deciles; so the distribution was quite homogeneous and skewed to the right. The Henmon-Nelson Test-Form A was used. Socioeconomic status would probably also show considerable homogeneity if measured by Chapin's Living Room Scale, family income, or occupational status. Hence, the differences between familiarity with proverbs and mechanical clichés by sex and rural and urban residence, though too small to have statistical significance, still may be real differences if the samples are as homogeneous as they appear, since they rather consistently point in the same direction. (See F. S. Chapin, "Design for Social Experiments," *American Sociological Review,* December, 1938, pp. 786-800.)

However, the study is very defective in many ways. The numbers are so small that the averages and percentages do not mean much, especially in the case of rural males, who not only were few in number, but had a wide range in the numbers of proverbs and clichés given. Some of the students took so much time writing proverbs that they had little time left for mechanical clichés, and vice versa. One urban boy wrote 98 proverbs and 61 clichés in the same time that boys on the average wrote 28 proverbs and 18 clichés.

ple and found that two or three people working inde-
pendently could assign almost all of the proverbs to the
categories with a high degree of agreement. "Doubtful"
cases were assigned finally by conference between the
tabulators and me. The same method was used on the
clichés. It would be interesting to see what kind of clas-
sification another investigator, using the same data and
the same or some other method, would finally arrive at.
It would be still more interesting to see what the result
would be if he should accept our classification and meth-
od, and retabulate the data. If anyone is equally curious,
we will gladly give him the data.

It is clear that this problem of classification and tabu-
lation will have to be solved before data collected in this
way can be used scientifically. As stated above and more
fully in my earlier paper, I believe there are sound rea-
sons for this method of collecting such data rather than
by the usual questionnaire or schedule method. If one
wants to know the significance of such verbal stereotypes
for actual adjustment behavior or their relation to social
control, one must, it seems to me, try to work with those
stereotypes which are, so to speak, on the surface of the
mind or at the "tip of the subject's tongue." Perhaps for
psychoanalysis or an understanding of crisis or aberrant
behavior, determination of coconscious or subconscious
stereotypes would be useful.

What use could be made of such knowledge if it could
be made scientific? It might be a useful means of discov-
ering and predicting trends in societal behavior. It would
make possible scientific study of the development and de-
cay of folkways and mores; it might take the study of
public opinion, "intellectual and moral climate," and
perhaps even the weasel word, "motivation," out of the
realm of speculation, literary insight, hopes, and fears,
and put it upon a sound natural science basis. If it is true

that urban males know more mechanical clichés and fewer proverbs of certain types than urban females, such as those clichés pertaining to efficiency, we might expect (although it would have to be tested) that they would respond more favorably to appeals using the stereotype, "efficiency." Their overt adjustment behavior might also show higher efficiency in comparable activities.

If it could be determined that there are measurable differences in the verbation of various segments of the population and then that such segments show characteristic measurable differences in specified types of overt adjustment behavior, not only could we use such scientific knowledge in social control, but we would be getting some light on "motivation" in purely sociological terms. We would be able to "explain" such behavior by stating the degree of association between the verbation and the overt behavior of people. We could say that the behavior "causes" the verbation or vice versa. If over a period of years, however, we should find mechanical cliché verbation of defined types increasing and the proverbial verbation of defined types decreasing, and found this associated with certain types of overt behavior, we could say that the mechanical verbation was "caused" by the increased use of technological devices and that the new types of behavior were "caused" by the increased use of mechanical verbation. It should be noted that I have used quotation marks around "cause" to indicate that only consistent sequential association is implied. Perhaps the "sequential" should be omitted.

For example, we found a large percentage of the mechanical clichés had reference to automobiles and tractors; another common source was electricity; movies and photography were referred to frequently; aviation followed in order. Now in twenty years, it is possible that aviation clichés would loom much larger. It is significant,

I think, that references to railroading were very scarce
and to shipping, almost nil. In another culture area, quite
a different result might be obtained, as, also, in this area
twenty years earlier or later.

I am suggesting that the concepts of "motivation" and
"causation" have no meaning for scientific sociological
analysis except in the sense here implied; and it is a sense
which enables us to approach the questions involved by
ordinary natural science methods. It is based upon gener-
alizations derived from a kind of research which is not
normative, or speculative, or subjective. If the methodo-
logical problems were solved, any competent man could
check any other man's work. I am also suggesting that
action usually precedes verbation and that it is only by
studying what men actually do that we can arrive at any
scientific knowledge of what their words really "mean."
Mechanical clichés and proverbial stereotypes have no
significance for scientific analysis of human behavior un-
less they can be shown to be in fairly constant antecedent
or consequent relation to measured overt adjustive be-
havior; and the same is true of all other types of words.

What we should like to know is why some types of ap-
peal succeed while others fail; what accounts for the
"planes and currents" of public opinion; why some pro-
posed "movements" that seem rational and needed are
stillborn while others that seem irrational and unneeded
sweep the country; why people make strong verbal pro-
fessions of certain kinds but act quite differently; in short,
what is the actual relation between action and verbation,
between values and verbation, between attitudes as I have
defined them elsewhere and overt adjustment or nonad-
justment behavior. It should be noted that I use neither
"value" nor "attitude" in the Thomas-Znaniecki sense.
It also should be noted that this discussion implies a the-
ory of social causation, social change, and social control

considerably different from that of the usual life history, case study, or human document approach. It attempts to study the factors in "social becoming" at a more elementary and, I think, more fundamental level than the human document and at the same time escapes many of the methodological difficulties which plague the human document and case study investigator. It does not depend upon the vague and logically loose schema of values, attitudes, wishes, et cetera, with the additional involvements of subjective and objective aspects of culture. It is consistent with tested and tried natural science theory and method. It suggests a way of studying statistically the organic interactions between verbation and technological elements in culture, phenomena which I believe to be basic to "social becoming" and therefore to social control. It avoids the logical contradiction implied by material and nonmaterial culture; it puts the vexing questions of motivation and causation in a new setting, and might throw considerable light upon questions usually posed under such rubrics as cultural lag, cultural contradiction and conflict. By this method one could study acculturation, diffusion, isolation, and all the so-called social processes. They are all present in the verbal and overt behavior of people.

The attitude studies, whether by the human document method of Thomas or the scale method of Thurstone, have not been so fruitful in giving us *"laws* of social becoming" as we hoped they would. The reason, perhaps, is that they attempt to deal with too complex and undefined social systems. It is a pretty well verified generalization that any system amenable to profitable scientific analysis must be very simple and contain relatively few variables and those of relatively pure and homogeneous constitution. Perhaps we would get somewhere if we should spend more time upon such investigation as that of Mayo

and Whitehead at the Western Electric, D. S. Thomas and associates on the observation of social behavior, and such verbation studies as are herein suggested, and the relations between observed overt behavior and verbation. Our slogan should be, "Keep the social system simple so the variables can be controlled." L. J. Henderson has been preaching this doctrine to sociologists for some years. It is probable that scientific laws of sociology will be formulated only as a result of intimate, intensive, quantitative studies of small, simple, social systems composed of relatively "pure," stable, homogeneous variables. After we have done this, we may then go on to greater things.

I believe that intensive scientific analysis of stereotyped verbation in connection with similar studies of what people actually do, societal habituation, with careful control of the relevant variables concerned, may throw some scientific light on questions similar to those enumerated above and on many others of equal import. I further believe that analysis of the ways in which people actually use tools, machines, and other elements of so-called material culture, with the attendant thought ways, feeling ways, and speech ways generated thereby, will do a great deal to give us some understanding of "intellectual, emotional, and moral climate" and enable us to forecast and perhaps even to control some aspects of societal "weather."

BASIC CONCEPTS IN CASE WORK PRACTICE*

MARGARET COCHRAN BRISTOL

Florida State College for Women

Social work as a whole is one of the leading professions today, and social case work is its oldest division. In spite of this, teachers and practitioners alike have been unwilling to set forth general rules that could be applied in case work situations. We all know of the requests by students entering the field—requests for rules and formulae—anything that would give them something definite by which to proceed. The response almost always is that each situation must be treated on an individual basis, that it is not possible to give a set of rules that would be applicable to all situations. And so the young students and case workers have to continue their efforts on a trial and error basis to crystallize and integrate their own ideas as to what social case work really is.

While it is agreed that individualization is the core of case work practice and that it is not possible to give rules and formulae as it is in an exact science, it is believed that case work theory has reached the point at which it is possible to formulate certain fundamental concepts that will help not only the student to emerge from the haze which has surrounded him but also the practitioner who has been unable to integrate in any orderly fashion his own philosophy of social case work. The following discussion is, therefore, an effort to list in a more or less orderly way a few of the basic concepts of social case work as it is practiced today.

The following concepts are simple, even elementary, in their implications. However, these concepts must be thoroughly assimilated as a part of the habits of the case worker and must be utilized in her everyday activity.

Much has been written about the therapeutic relationship between the patient and the psychiatrist and between the client and the case worker. However, only a small portion of case workers today are qualified to utilize this kind of relationship therapy. Even in the face of this, the client-worker relationship is still basic in any case work situation.

This leads us to the first concept which may be stated as follows. The individual who is in need can help himself more effectively if the relationship with the case worker is a free and friendly one, a relationship in which the client feels comfortable and at ease. As social workers, we are interested in helping the individual to help himself; and, if he does not have confidence in the case worker, he will not be able to do this effectively. A great deal has been said about the doctor's "bedside manner," which puts the patient at ease and instills confidence in the doctor. And so with the practice of social case work, the practitioner must have this ability to inspire confidence, to encourage freedom of response, and to foster the desire in the client to help himself.

A second fundamental concept and one which is closely related to the first is that the self-respect and integrity of the individual must be protected and maintained, that is, the client has a right to be himself, to work out his own problems, and to make his own decisions except perhaps in those instances in which his decisions and activity are antagonistic to the welfare of others. Case work has gone through a period when the case worker decided what was wrong with the client and then proceeded to give whatever treatment she thought was needed. Sometimes the

client accepted it and sometimes he didn't. However, in the light of our present knowledge, we now recognize that the best guide in rendering case work service to the individual is that which the individual thinks and believes are his needs. There are occasions when it is not possible to give the person what he wants, but at least the contact can be terminated if the client so desires after he has been told that he cannot be given what he has requested. Throughout all the contacts mutual participation must be present.

A third concept, and perhaps one that is as fundamental as any of the others, is that the needs of the individual are the center of the activity of the case worker. The case worker may be limited in her practice by certain community customs and mores, by various agency policies, and by more or less definite financial limitations; but with all of these she still directs all of her activity to help meet the needs of the individual. As stated before, the best guide in giving case work service is that which the client thinks and believes are his needs. However, unless the case worker is aware of the various implications of this, there may be the tendency unconsciously perhaps to utilize this as a means of rationalizing her own lack of accomplishment in her contacts with the client. It is so easy for the case worker to say that, since the client does not recognize his real needs or since he does not seem to accept her, she, as a case worker, has no right to continue in such a situation. Rather, it is recognized that we must start with a level of treatment that is acceptable to the client. As treatment progresses, the client then may be assisted in the development of an appreciation of the more fundamental needs or needs which he did not at first recognize as such.

Another concept is that the needs of the individual to which the case worker must relate herself come from two

sources or from a combination of the two. First, they may come from an inadequate adjustment on the part of the individual to the environment, or, second, they may come from an environment that is ill adapted to the needs of the individual. The case worker may therefore approach the problem in either of two ways, or by some combination of the two, depending upon the situation. She may attempt to alter the environment so that it will be better fitted to meet the needs of the person, or she may try to improve the capacity of the individual to utilize the environment more effectively. Parenthetically, it must be recognized that frequently other necessary environmental changes can be brought about only by the process of broad social reform and as such are beyond the immediate case work approach.

A fifth concept is that the needs of the individual can be understood only by determining their origin and by analyzing the habit patterns, the scale of values, and attitudes that have been developed by previous environmental experiences.

This can be illustrated by the family situation that came to the attention of a family welfare agency some time ago. The father asked for assistance with a young ten-year-old son who was getting into difficulty in the neighborhood, a very congested one in a large city. To the worker the problem seemed to center around two facts. First, the housing was very poor. The crowded condition did not provide space for the boy's own use. Second, there was in the neighborhood a gang of boys who seemed to have a bad influence upon him. In view of this, plans were made for the family to move to a new neighborhood a few miles distant from the one in which the family lived at the time of application. The father was able to make the change financially and was willing to do it and so moved to the place that was selected by

the case worker. However, it took only a very short time to bring out a new set of problems. The parents, who were of foreign birth, had always lived in this one neighborhood, which was settled by people of the same nationality. The mother was most unhappy in the new neighborhood, saying that she could not make friends with her neighbors who looked down upon her because she did not look, act, or speak like them. And even though the new home provided actual physical space for the boy to have his own room and playthings, no substitute was offered for the stimulation that he had received from the old gang. As a result, the boy not only made every effort to keep up contacts with the gang but also began to steal and to exhibit other more serious difficulties.

Not only was the case worker most superficial in her evaluation of the causes and origins of the son's trouble but also was lacking in an understanding and appreciation of the parents' needs and desires that had been developed to a large extent by their environmental experiences.

It has been pointed out that the case worker directs her activity to the meeting of the needs of the individual. However, in order to do this there is another concept, namely, that the case worker must not consider the needs alone but she must also consider the individual who has the needs. There is too often the tendency to become so involved in the problem that the person himself may be forgotten. This has been especially true during the past few years when the unemployed people were treated more or less en masse without consideration as to how the individual person was affected by the loss of work.

A seventh concept is that the case worker plays a dynamic and positive role in the relationship with the individual, even though the case worker may be utilizing that which is popularly known as the passive approach.

The worker becomes a part of a new environment—a new combination of forces which can stimulate and motivate the client to bring about the change within himself. In many instances because of this different relationship, which in itself gives security to the individual, he obtains new satisfactions, develops new desires and needs, and replaces old habits with new ones on the basis of a realignment of his scale of values. However, the degree and direction of change are determined largely by the previous experiences of the individual. And even though the case worker does play a positive role, it is still the client who must assume responsibility to meet his own needs. The case worker cannot accept final responsibility for the client.

The statement that the individual client must assume the responsibility to meet his own needs is illustrated by the following situation of the Wayne family, who applied to the public agency for financial assistance. The family consisted of the parents and three boys, all over the age of sixteen. Mr. Wayne, who was unable to work because of old age and illness, had found it difficult to accept the idea of receiving relief and of allowing his wife to work. He kept reiterating that he was accustomed to a better standard of living and lamented that the boys were not going to have the same chance he had had. The father fostered friction among the sons, upholding one in his antisocial conduct.

The case worker had been aware of the growing coolness between Mr. and Mrs. Wayne and of the father's unwholesome influence upon the boys. An attempt was made to establish such a relationship with the different members of the family that they would be enabled to use the services of the case worker if desired. Also an attempt was made to bring about an awareness of the situation within the family. However, these attempts were not suc-

cessful. In view of this, case work service was limited to that of giving relief. But three months after this Mrs. Wayne wrote to the agency saying that Mr. Wayne was becoming more difficult, that he was having a bad influence upon the boys, and asked directly and specifically for the services of a social worker.

The letter gave evidence to the fact not only that Mrs. Wayne was aware of her need but also that she wanted assistance in working out her problem. With this recognition the case worker was in a position to give more actual help than before.

An eighth fundamental concept is that the case worker must be able to recognize the meaning and value that behavior has for a particular individual. If a man deserts his family or drinks, or if a child has temper tantrums, there is a meaning in such behavior to the person exhibiting it; and unless the case worker can find out the cause and the meaning of such conduct, she cannot plan and direct her own activity.

A ninth concept is related to the necessity for the case worker to be aware of and to be able to adjust to various limitations in such a way that she does not become emotionally disturbed by these limitations, especially those which she can do nothing about, at least at the moment. In the first place, there are the environmental limitations including financial limitations, limitations of available resources and facilities, and limitations in the understanding of social problems of the community. In the second place, there are the limitations within the individual case worker, limitations in her own ability and her own capacity to understand and diagnose certain problems. Finally, there is the limitation of professional functions, a limitation that requires sensitivity in defining the scope of one's professional activity.

A last concept is that the case worker must be able to

understand herself, her own emotional drives and compulsions, before she can fully accept those of others. The worker by so understanding herself will only then be able to work through her own attitudes to the point where they will be unmoralistic and unbiased, and only then can she be objective and understanding of the client and his needs.

Other concepts could be discussed, but it is believed that the more general ones as shown in current case work practice have been included. It should be borne in mind that the foregoing points are to be utilized only as a basis for orienting one's thinking while in the process of securing a more thorough understanding of the basic principles underlying human behavior and its treatment.

IS NAZISM SOCIALISM?

JOHN ERIC NORDSKOG

The University of Southern California

Is Nazism socialistic in more than its name, National Socialism? There is no one definition for socialism as our criterion in approaching this question, and any selection may meet with criticism. As has been well said by J. Ramsay MacDonald, "Socialism is a tendency, not a revealed dogma, and therefore it is modified in its forms of expression from generation to generation."[1] Not only socialism but related terms such as collectivism, communism, and anarchism have suffered equal ambiguity. Sometimes collectivism is used as the more general term, while for others socialism embraces communism and collectivism. In dealing with Nazism, nothing will be lost by having socialism broad and inclusive in meaning.

According to Marxian theorists, socialism may be regarded as the first phase and communism as the final stage of socialistic development, the difference thus being one of degree. It is not necessary for our purpose to evaluate the Marxian reward according to service (for socialism) and with reference to need (for communism), nor need we give consideration to theories of labor value and surplus value, or any other assumptions of that kind usually attributed to the Marxian synthesis. Nothing would be gained, for instance, by stressing the methodology of socialism, which might be experimental and evolutionary, or revolutionary as in the case of communism. The Italian and German Fascists have been just as revolu-

---

[1] J. Ramsay MacDonald, *The Socialist Movement* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1911), p. 195.

The article on "Socialism" by Oscar Jaszi, in the *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1934, Vol. XIV), gives an excellent survey of the changing meanings of socialism.

tionary in procedure as were the Russian Bolshevists, but their purposes have not been the same as for the latter. It is even claimed by Marxists of today that Fascism came into power as a defense of capitalism against the rising power of the working class, and particularly as against the threat of socialism and communism; granting that this is debatable, yet in so far as it is acceptable it emphasizes the Nazi opposition to socialism.

If we were to adopt state socialism as our criterion, under which form state ownership and state control of production would be the goal, German National Socialism will be found to measure short except in the element of state control. Co-operative socialism is also out of the picture; this form distrusts the state and fears the overdevelopment of bureaucracy, and would base its system upon the organization of independent producers, comparable more directly with guild socialism, syndicalism, and industrial unionism. In due course it will appear that National Socialism is not in sympathy with this kind of socialism either.

For further refinement in defining socialism, it may not be amiss to exclude the so-called communism of primitive peoples, of early Christians, and of Catholic and Protestant church organizations, because these are not and have not been socialistic movements. As a classic example of another type, the Incas of Peru have been credited with communistic organization, but their form was war communism for military dominance and not designed to free the masses from exploitation. As another exception, municipal ownership and operation of public utilities are not actually socialism; rather, it is a purely utilitarian program superimposed upon a capitalist system. The purpose is to safeguard certain common-sense standards of health, hygiene, or service; but this is for particular and local application and not for general so-

cial welfare, as socialism would have it. Various schemes of planned economy and partial socialization in Europe and America might on the surface seem to be socialistic. They do not qualify as such, however, merely by placing the capitalist system under government control. As has already been suggested in the reference to state socialism, state control in itself, under Fascism or any other system, would not fulfill the conditions of socialism. Another word of caution: socialism must not be confused with the social process known as socialization, which signifies individual or group growth in "we-feeling," "other-mindedness," or concern for the welfare of others.

The term socialism may have various institutional relationships, but the heart of it, the *sine qua non* of it, is economic, although political means may at the same time be used to achieve economic and other social ends. The writer would ordinarily agree with the thesis of Harold J. Laski, in *The State in Theory and Practice*,[2] that the economic factor is the bedrock upon which the social superstructure is built, which of course includes the political institutions. Professor Laski regards the economic factor as the predominant but not the only element in determining change, and he makes due allowance for reciprocal influences between the factors of social change. The functional nature of the government or state is therefore fundamentally affected by, and perhaps determined by, the economic forms of production and distribution that prevail in the society. It may be, however, that in a political dictatorship the economic life of the community stands in a more subordinate position and is shaped by the purposes of the state rather than the converse. The result under Fascist states has been a blending of ideas borrowed from capitalism, socialism, syndical-

2 Harold J. Laski, *The State in Theory and Practice* (New York: The Viking Press, 1935), Part II, pp. 87-192; n. b., 102-4.

ism, and any other opportunistic factor or system. Perhaps this is why some observers have tended to describe Fascism or Nazism as state socialism, and it is more than likely that state control has erroneously been regarded as socialism. Having allowed for various typical meanings and having recognized that socialism possesses a periphery of institutional ramifications, all sound definitions will be found to have in common an economic core, and the following one by Jesse W. Hughan is representative and recommended as suitable for our purpose: "Socialism is the political movement of the working class which aims to abolish exploitation by means of the collective ownership and democratic management of the basic instruments of production and distribution."[3]

How then, does Nazism, or National Socialism in its complete name, fulfill such a definition or ideology? Is it a political movement? Yes, obviously so. But is it a movement of the working class in Germany? No, the workers are instead regimented, commandeered, subordinated to the state. Does the Nazi regime abolish exploitation? No, the entire society is actually being exploited to provide for a nationalistic program of rearmament and imperialism. Is there any collective ownership under the new system in Germany? Not within the meaning of socialism. Is there any democratic management of any organization under the Nazi regime? No, quite the contrary. Democratic values, principles, and methods have been anathema to the Hitlerites and the Nazi party. And how have all of these items a bearing on the basic instruments of production and distribution? Private ownership of such instruments is permitted and defended, provided the owner is willing to subscribe his portion to the sup-

[3] Jesse Wallace Hughan, *The Facts of Socialism* (New York: John Lane Company, 1913), p. 67. The definition quoted above is also featured by Jerome Davis, *Contemporary Social Movements* (New York: Century Company, 1930), p. 75.

port of the nationalistic and militaristic program of the Reich. But personal leadership in connection with such ownership is nominal and subject to that of *Der Führer* and his direct aides. The theory and program of the Nazi party may now be evaluated in some detail.

As applied to the economic system, the basic principle of National Socialism is that no group, interest, or motive may come into collision with the national will as expressed by the Reich. It is essential for a completely unitary, totalitarian state that every interest be subjected to a single purpose and a single will. Thus the core of Nazism is nationalism rather than socialism. There is scarcely so much as lip service given to the social values of socialism. By weighing pro and con the attitudes representing the Nazi party in action, the issue stands in sharp relief.

The Nazis very positively endorse obedience, discipline, duty, physical strength, physical courage, self-sacrifice (even death), violence, martial display, ceremonial formality, maintenance of social rank, masculinity, large families, national economic self-sufficiency, social solidarity, racial homogeneity, religious homogeneity, and paganism.[4] These values may be traced far back in German history and are by no means original with the Nazi party or its leadership; yet all these attitudes are part and parcel with Hitler's nationalism, and they are definitely contrary to values attributed to socialism. The only thing new about them, perhaps, is their synthesis to emphasize German nationalism and imperialism while attempting to restore the authoritarian state of Frederick the Great.

[4] These, as well as the negative attitudes and values which follow, are discussed by J. J. M. Scandrett in a master's thesis entitled, "The Foundations of the Social Principles of National Socialists in the Traditional Social Values and Attitudes of the German People," The University of Southern California, May, 1937. Mr. Scandrett is correct in attributing extreme nationalism to the movement, but in the writer's opinion he errs in crediting the same movement with extreme socialistic qualities.

On the other hand, the Nazis are decidedly opposed to individualism, democracy, liberalism, rationality, self-indulgence, material pleasure, compassion, moderation, fairness, and honesty (both internally and internationally, as it happens), Christianity, Judaism, and communism. Again, these values have a long history in German experience, but have been synthesized on the negative side as representing Nazism or Hitlerism. Clearly enough, some of them are social and moral values that one expects to find in socialism.

The socialist movement was once dynamic in Germany, but had been waning and reached a low ebb by 1914. The Nazi party from its beginning was opposed to the ideology usually known as socialism and in particular was opposed to communism. But the name socialism was still something to conjure with, and Hitler offered the masses, who were just about in despair, *his* brand of socialism, which was merely another name for nationalism plus totalitarianism, mixed up with a philosophy of socialization which, according to the warning given above, is not socialism. Briefly, then, Hitler's socialism is identified with nationalism. For Hitler, socialism is a devotion to the people—he who knows no higher ideal than the welfare of his people is a socialist; which at best is a socioethical postulate for socialism by belief. For Hitler, again, even anti-Semitism is socialism. And does not the elimination of unemployment prove that Nazism is socialism? This, their one boast, is incidental to wholesale regimentation of labor necessary to carry out an intensive armament economy that depends upon a totalitarian exploitation of workers and to some extent of employers as well. The threefold relationship among workers, employers, and the state is sometimes spoken of as a partnership, but in this arrangement the state regards itself as authoritarian and dominant, which is inconsistent with

socialism. And most certainly it is not industrial democracy. The German government exercises the most extreme concentration of political and economic power known in any modern government. The German Labor Front, as it is fondly called, is thus an example of regimentation and not of socialism. The "Beauty of Work" philosophy of the Nazis, concerning hygienic and aesthetic improvements in factories and industrial establishments, also is not socialism; it is part of a movement for industrial modernization characteristic of the entire Western world, sponsored in part by socialism, but equally realized under capitalist production and distribution.

To carry out the will of the Reich, agricultural and industrial "estates" and corporative organizations have been devised. These are strictly for regimentation and control and are not socialism. The National Socialist version of corporativism means that the corporations are in the hands of the state. Germany has surpassed Italy in the exercise of such control, which may be one of the objectives of Italian Fascism but has scarcely passed the blueprint stage in the latter country. Handicrafts, industry, and trade in Germany are also organized into chambers, groups, and cartels, with compulsory membership along regional and functional lines, but leadership in these traces back to Hitler's Reich, for which the Minister for Economic Affairs stands as the responsible agent of the authoritarian state. As another bureaucratic example, the Labor Trustees for the thirteen districts under the German Nazi system do not mediate, but command. They regulate according to the decrees of the state—or *Der Führer*.

To emphasize further the role of the Reich as it governs economic distribution, wages are determined by decree; prices may also be determined by decree; profits are

limited by decree; so are other returns from capital. Investments are to be made only with government approval; the financial duty is first of all to the state, and banks have practically been nationalized, or commandeered, as it were. Trade and commerce, both domestic and foreign, are subject to the will of the Reich. Under all this regulation, big business in Germany has continued to have advantages over the small business man, and the smaller fry have been frozen out and forced into factories where they have been regimented hopelessly among the rank and file. Those who have positions of privilege are protected therein. In general, whatever one's position or class in Germany today, he is supposedly fixed in it, according to a closed social caste principle adopted by the Reich. Dissatisfaction with one's lot invites the concentration camp. Although government regulation has worked somewhat favorably for the larger enterprises, this is counterbalanced by the fact that ownership of property is secondary to the leadership principle which alone prevails throughout the country. Those who are nominally the leaders of their own enterprises must submit to superior leadership, that of the state which commands. All factors of production are thus seen to be subject to state compulsion, with the concentration camp as the ultimate economic regulator.

Under the present policy of the German government, private ownership is not prohibited *if* the individual is truly of the German *Volk* and responds to the financial calls of the Reich. Failing in this, anyone may be summarily expropriated without recompense. The anti-Semitic persecution is basically one of the expedient means of expropriation in order to finance the military program of the Reich. This is exploitation of a group or class and contrary to socialism. But even an impartial requirement that all Germans must support the rearmament drive,

either financially or by the contribution of goods, would not make the program worthy of the name socialism, because the purpose of socialism as an ideology is not that of commandeering a people and their resources for a military machine. And this, briefly, is the sum and substance of National Socialism to date: nationalism and armament by means of policies that are political and non-economic.

Whereas National Socialism emphasizes racial homogeneity and has featured pogroms against the Jews, socialism has no room for racial prejudices. Whereas National Socialism is antidemocratic, the socialist philosophy subscribes to democratic values. Even in Russia the dictatorship of the proletariat is not in itself socialistic, but is regarded as a transitional phase to bring about eventually, in theory at least, communism. Dictatorship and totalitarianism are not essential to socialism; the latter may be achieved by democratic means and parliamentary procedure. This is not intended to imply that socialism may not be achieved in Germany after the present nationalist objectives have been attained; at present, however, German National Socialism is Fascism; it is dictatorship; and it is totalitarianism; but scarcely qualifies as socialism.

One of the most cherished tenets of the Nazi leaders is the "Blood and Soil" theory. To claim that living on German soil produces a peculiar purity of racial stock (the German *Volk*) is fallacious in the extreme; so is the Aryanism and Nordic supremacy theory coupled up with it. But even if such wishful thinking were granted as true, it would be utterly foreign to socialism as an ideology.

Being ruled by one party without opposition, whether it be the German Nazis, the Italian Fascists, or the Russian Communists, in so far as it smothers the voice of the masses and prevents democratic action, is also contrary

to the spirit of socialism as defined above. Opposition to Christianity or any other religion is contrary to and definitely not essential to socialism. Tolerance rather than intolerance, and sympathetic understanding on cultural and racial lines, are basic to the role of socialism.

The German system operates with an economy of scarcity, in so far as it is economic at all. Instead of an administered scarcity, socialism advocates an economy of plenty, although some theorists might reply by saying there is no economy of plenty. While the German Nazis claim to have set every available man and woman to work, they have also leveled their wages considerably and have therefore lowered the level of living (standard of living) for many who were more prosperous in the past, and instead of security the Nazis have spread want and fear. Public improvements might be cited to show how much the country has progressed under National Socialism, but on the other hand the pinch of scarcity is being increasingly felt as resources are being commandeered for the military program. Those who possess wealth and power, however, have maintained some of the privileges of vested interests at the expense of the masses.

The Nazi program is a grand scheme for requisitioning a nation; it commandeers anyone and everyone; and instead of using resources constructively, so far the ultimate objective has been a destructive war machine which would, even in a major war, exploit the masses for the welfare of a few. It is possible to rationalize the Nazi policies in terms of rebuilding the German empire and in terms of scrapping the Treaty of Versailles, thus claiming that the whole thing is for the welfare of the German people. In the opinion of the writer, such motivation would be no better than that of the Incas of Peru who were referred to as having a war communism, but this was rejected as outside the pale of socialism.

It has been suggested, as nomenclature is also strained by rationalization, that the German form might be called Patriotic Socialism. Yet nothing is gained by changing the terminology, and it is not necessary to discriminate (patriotically) between national and international socialism. The values of socialism would be similar in either case.

As a summary statement, Nazism with its nationalism and totalitarianism, its positive and negative lists of social values, its price fixing, state control of investments and returns on capital, control of local and foreign trade, regimentation of workers and employers in estates and corporations, groups and cartels, its Labor Front, "Beauty of Work" campaign, its "Blood and Soil" philosophy, its persecution of the Jews, its rule by fear, its antidemocracy, and so on, would not qualify as socialism; but the system might well deserve the name of "predatory nationalism." We find in Germany not a people free from exploitation, but a people subordinated to the state and its dictatorship.

RECENT TRENDS IN RURAL SOCIAL WORK

A. A. SMICK

The State College of Washington

An analysis and interpretation of historical trends in any field of endeavor usually form the basis for intelligent planning for the future. The field of rural social work provides no exception to this generally accepted principle. Recognition of this fact and the desire for a better understanding of the significance of recent trends in rural social work led to the analysis and evaluation that follow.

In making this analysis and evaluation, four sources of information were used: (1) articles in professional journals; (2) papers presented at national conferences of social work and rural life; (3) observation, including interviews with professional persons, rural leaders, and lay persons during the past ten years; and (4) a survey of more than fifty national agencies engaged in promoting some form of social work in 1938.

Historically, three major periods of development stand out clearly, namely, the prewar period, the postwar period from 1918 to 1930, and the depression years from 1930 to the present. Although these periods stand out clearly and are quite evident to the student of the problem, the trends in the types of work, techniques used, forms of organization and methods of administration appearing in each period are somewhat more elusive. It is these types, techniques, forms, and methods about which we are primarily concerned.

Trends prior to the World War. Rural social work did not develop any high degree of co-ordination prior to the World War, but in spite of this fact enjoyed a rather rapid growth from the beginning of the twentieth

century. This development found its expression, largely, through the channels of privately supported social work, but certain public welfare activities were indicative of a growing social consciousness of the need for action through public channels.

Private social work in rural areas was greatly accentuated in its development by formal recognition given to rural social problems by state-wide charities aid associations, the work of state-wide children's protective agencies, that of Christian associations and character building agencies, and the efforts of rural church workers. Public social work in these areas received its major impetus as a result of the development of the juvenile court movement, the work of the Country Life Commission, the survey work of the White House Conference, and the enactment of mothers' aid laws.[1]

Although recognized for its rather significant steps taken in the development of social work in rural areas, this period was characterized by an unplanned and haphazard growth.[2] This unplanned and haphazard growth seems to have been due to two factors, namely, a lack of knowledge of actual conditions existing in rural areas and a lack of interest which naturally followed as a result of this absence of adequate information.[3]

In spite of this fact, it was during this period that the appointment of national commissions, the organization of national conferences, and the enactment of social legislation specifically called attention to and created an inter-

---

[1] Josephine C. Brown, "Rural Social Work," *Social Work Year Book* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1935), 427-31.

[2] For a more detailed discussion of the specific conditions, read H. Ida Curry, "The Status of Social Work in Rural Communities," *Proceedings of the National Conference of Social Work* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1921), pp. 12-21.

[3] The survey of more than fifty nation-wide social work agencies, made by the author, clearly indicates that, although recognition is now given to the need for social work in rural areas, facts of actual conditions existing are still woefully inadequate.

est in programs of co-ordination for rural church services. These programs found a means of expression through diverse channels during the period that followed.

Trends in the postwar period from 1918 to 1930. Whereas the prewar period was characterized by unplanned and haphazard work developed mainly through the medium of private agencies and resources, in the postwar period rural social work was forcefully brought to the attention of the nation through the efforts of both public and private agencies. Public and quasi-public agencies assumed a large share of the responsibility for the task of pioneering in this uncharted field.

One of these agencies, the American Red Cross, in developing its home service program for veterans and their families provided the greatest impetus to social work in rural areas. The work of this agency disclosed the fact that rural areas too had their slums.[4] As a result of these findings, a major drive was started by the Red Cross and other agencies to organize and co-ordinate rural social resources. In this program of organization there was a definite trend toward the use of the county as a unit of operation.

Recognizing the importance of this work, the American Country Life Association appointed a committee on rural social work in 1919, which concerned itself primarily with research in rural areas. At the same time, private foundations, operating on a national scale, were financing demonstration projects for the purpose of displaying the feasibility of social work in rural areas. Still others conducted surveys of training facilities for rural social workers. Indications are that a large percentage of the demonstration projects were so successful that they were soon taken over by the community or county and

4 See Virginia Wing, "Rural Social Work in Scioto County, Ohio," *Proceedings of the National Conference of Social Work* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1922), pp. 270-74.

financed through local funds, both public and private.

It was only natural that all of this activity on the part of the Red Cross and other agencies should call the attention of legislators to the need for public social work services on a state-wide basis in rural and urban areas alike. As a result, welfare and child welfare departments were created in a number of states, and by 1930 approximately half of the states had such departments. These welfare departments, which usually had county units of administration, provided a medium for the development of public rural social work services on a rather widespread basis.

Interesting as these historical facts may be, they in themselves do not provide us with the meat of the problem. This becomes available only when we stop to analyze critically and evaluate the types of services provided and the techniques used in promoting such services. Such an analysis and evaluation will provide us with a picture of the shortcomings of these services and techniques and enable us to build more wisely and securely in laying our foundation for the future.

Students of community organization have quite generally agreed upon certain fundamental principles. One of these is that to be successful, the demand for a program must come from within the community and be based on a felt need. In rural areas during this postwar period too many of the social work programs were superimposed by outside agencies and were foreign to the rural area involved. Consequently, there was too often a lack of interest and often open opposition to the programs proposed. This opposition appears to have been almost entirely lacking where the community itself asked for aid in promoting a social service plan.

Not only must the demand for a service come from within a community and be based on a felt need, but the

type of service must be applicable to the area involved and be understood by the people upon whom we depend for the success of the program. Because this postwar period was one characterized by specialization in urban areas, it was only natural that rural workers, who were mostly urban trained, should attempt to transplant these specialized services. The rural areas did not have adequate resources to support a specialized program. Neither did the workers succeed in interpreting the services of a diversified and specialized program to the people of rural communities. Consequently, many of the rural services were doomed to failure before they were started.[5]

Still another weakness of the rural social work services of this period was the fact that they were generally recognized as being designed for certain special classes and, consequently, lacked a community flavor. It was to be expected that a program that did not reach deep into the life of the community and render a recognized constructive service to all groups would lack popular support. This weakness is still present under the provisions of the Social Security Act, where aid is available only to certain groups. The weakness of such a program in gaining full community support should be self-evident.

It is significant to note that in practically all instances failures of rural social services were due, mainly, to a lack of understanding of rural resources, institutions, problems, and attitudes. This in turn was primarily due to a lack of training facilities for social workers in rural areas. With the establishment of graduate schools of social work in rural areas and with supervised field work in typically rural settings, this weakness should disappear.[6]

[5] In a survey of welfare services in thirteen counties, made by the author under the auspices of the Washington State Planning Council in 1934, these factors formed the basis for most of the complaints made by rural leaders against social work services.

[6] For a further discussion of this point see A. A. Smick, "Training for Rural Social Work," *Sociology and Social Research*, 22:538-44, July-August, 1938.

Developments since 1930.   The depression years since 1930 have witnessed an expansion of rural social work unprecedented in the history of the United States. This development, of necessity, has primarily been of a public nature. The unit of administration has generally been the county, and the social work has been of a generic type or at least developed along generic lines.

This development laid the foundation for an integrated plan of federal-state-local organization of social services in rural areas. Although this plan is still in its formative stages, an analysis of the trends that have appeared within the past eight years provides a rather definite clue to what form the plan will take in the future. To date several stages have made their appearance.

During the first years of the depression the doctrine of "rugged individualism" still predominated, and attempts that were made to interest state and national leaders in providing public assistance in meeting the relief needs of the rural areas met with small success. Because of a lack of resources the facilities that already existed in rural areas were drastically curtailed.[7] However, as it became apparent that prosperity was not "just around the corner" and that private resources were not equal to the task, first county and then state officials organized emergency relief programs that definitely affected rural as well as urban areas.

The greatest single impetus, however, was given to rural social work when county and state efforts failed and the federal government was forced to enter the picture, first through R.F.C. loans and later through F.E.R.A. Under the supervision and sponsorship of these federal agencies, state and county relief administrations were established, which in most states developed into permanent

[7] Wilma van Dusseldorp, "Rural Social Work," *Social Work Year Book* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1937), pp. 430-31.

departments of public welfare. Through these administrative units, set up in practically every county in the nation, rural social services gained a strong foothold.

With the passage of the Social Security Act in 1935, recognition was given to the fact that the social group must provide the resources for the development of public social services on a full-time basis. Although some students of the problem had believed that the demands for government expansion of social work activities were merely a temporary reaction to the extreme individualism of the previous years, the enactment of permanent and far-reaching social security legislation indicated quite clearly that public social services on an enlarged scale were here to stay. This legislation has assured increased social services in rural areas. This assurance is provided through the means of special federal appropriations earmarked for rural areas and the fact that every county in the state must be a participating unit in the Social Security program in order to make the state eligible for federal matching funds.

While these developments were taking place, several other trends were making their appearance. In the first place, the unit of administration has become larger. Particularly has this been true in rural areas where resources are limited and where administrative costs create a real problem.[8] In the second place, there has been a definite trend toward greater centralization of authority. Expressing itself in the form of state and federal control and supervision, this centralization of authority has vitally affected rural areas where individualism and self-initiative have had a firm foothold.[9]

[8] In the state of Washington two and three counties have consolidated their welfare services in several instances for the sake of cutting down administrative costs and presumably increasing the efficiency of the services provided.

[9] Recent months have witnessed a definite attempt on the part of local officials to regain the control previously held over local public welfare services.

Such has been the story of the development of rural social work in the twentieth century. What does the future hold? Will the paternalistic pattern of urban social work influence or possibly destroy that individual initiative of the rural area so vital to the American democratic process? Is the trend toward a larger unit of administration based on sound policy? Will the trend toward centralization of control and supervision eventually transcend its original objective of raising the standards of service? The answers to these questions lie in the experiences of tomorrow.

ASIATIC STEREOTYPES AND NATIONAL DISTANCE

EDWARD C. McDONAGH

Fellow in Sociology

The University of Southern California

The importance of stereotypes in contributing to national forms of social distance is objectively evidenced in the Sino-Japanese conflict. Substantially, these adverse and emotionalized generalizations work havoc upon reason and the common respect of one nation due another. With little exception the prevailing negative attitudes between China and Japan are confined to (1) person-to-group and (2) group-to-group relations. Spatial and recent cultural isolation has largely ruled out the direct person-to-person relationship between members of these two nations; hence, propagandistic literature has been able to depict the people of each nation in the lowest terms conceivable.

Chinese stereotypes of Japan. As the Chinese consider their culture superior to that of Japan, most of the stereotypes held by the former reveal themselves through the operation of vertical distance evaluations. The Chinese entertain the idea of having been primarily instrumental in diffusing the essence of a modern culture to Japan. The Chinese not infrequently go so far as to assert that before the advent of their culture the island was populated by barbarians. To the Chinese, Japan has not been appreciative enough of the role China has played in educating the barbarians. Further, according to Robert Morton, who has made a special study of Sino-Japanese relations, "The Chinese. . . consider the Japanese to be vulgar upstarts, ungrateful and unprofitable pupils."[1]

[1] "Japan and China: A War of Minds," *Pacific Affairs*, 10:305, September, 1937.

The cultural patterns enumerated by the Chinese as having been conferred by the Chinese upon the Japanese are numerous. They include art patterns, language, legal and administrative systems, Buddhism and Confucianism. A considerable proportion of the Chinese leaders fancy that Japan has created nothing original. In substantiation of this point of view, Morton says, "Indeed, the popular Chinese view is that Japan has little of its own, save military vices and recent evils."[2] Because of the prevalence of Japanese soldiers in China and the effects of Chinese nationalism with its resultant propaganda, the Chinese have delineated the average Japanese as a ruthless general or admiral.

A fact worthy of note is the conviction among the Chinese that the Japanese are a dwarfish people. Not only by virtue of their conviction that they are culturally more enlightened do the Chinese assume superiority, but they also feel superior because of their taller stature. In the contemporary scene the Japanese have been stereotyped most frequently by the Chinese as being chiefly militarists and dwarfs.

Japanese stereotypes of China. The vertical distance which China has endeavored to impose upon Japan is no longer recognized by the Nipponese because, in their eyes, China's culture has degenerated to an innocuous set of values. Modern Japan considers it has turned the tables on China; for today Japan feels its culture to be far superior to the culture prevailing in China. Japanese literature on the Sino-Japanese conflict makes repeated mention of the fact that Japan has been a more skillful borrower of Western culture than has China. From this they deduce that China has been an adopter rather than an adapter of Western culture. According to contemporary Japanese leaders, China has not been able to discriminate

---

[2] *Loc. cit.*

between the good and the bad of Western culture. Tatsuo Kawai, a high official in the Japanese government, has said:

> The weakness in the Chinese efforts to acquire modern culture lies in the fact that the Chinese, instead of grasping its true spirit, have contented themselves with adopting only its superficial aspects. While blindly swallowing anything foreign, they have been throwing overboard that which they should have preserved by all means.
>
> In this respect Japan has been unusually successful. She has not forgotten to maintain an adequate equilibrium between spiritual culture and material (or let us say mechanical) civilization. This has been the secret of the remarkable development of modern Japan.[3]

Thus, one of the most popular Japanese stereotypes of the Chinese sets forth the idea that the Chinese have been merely "flippant borrowers" of Western culture.

The Japanese generally believe the following three stereotypes: the Chinese nation is composed of (1) bandits, (2) war lords, and (3) communists. Inasmuch as China has had considerable trouble with local bandits, the Japanese press has magnified the extensiveness of the modern bandit. Most of the efforts of the Chinese government toward the building of an adequate national defense have been interpreted in Tokyo as the activities of war lords. In fact, the Japanese have utilized the reputed widespread bandit movement in Northern China as one of the important reasons for intervention and consequent invasion of that area.

The Japanese government has objectively stereotyped Chiang Kai-shek as the epitome of Chinese banditry and militarism. Besides bringing "order" to China, the Japanese are determined to capture and hang Chiang Kaishek. The Japanese press has singled out this Chinese statesman as the cause of most of the anti-Japanese feeling in China. As Prince Tadashigi Shinadzu points out,

[3] Tatsuo Kawai, *Osaka Mainichi,* October 20, 1937, p. 3.

"The whole responsibility for China's clumsy international politics lies with Chiang Kai-shek, around whom are centered a handful of unscrupulous warlords and financiers."[4] They have accused Chiang Kai-shek of accepting aid from the communists. Because the communists of Inner Mongolia have joined with the forces of the national government in defensive measures toward Japan, the Japanese military leaders and politicians now have claimed that Chiang Kai-shek has become a communist in disguise. According to Prince Tadashigi Shinadzu, Chiang Kai-shek must be crushed:

His continuing in the responsible position of the ruler of China would bar forever the possibility of Sino-Japanese co-operation in the best interest of the Orient. Either Japan lives, or China lives: this is the situation which Sino-Japanese relations face if Chiang continues to rule in Nanking.[5]

The clash of stereotyped attitudes. Because of the emotional content and interaction of the Chinese and Japanese stereotypes, they have become powerful factors furthering social distance. Independent and critical thinking by the populace of both of these countries has been prevented because of the pseudopatriotic and propagandistic nature of the conflicting stereotypes. One of the most serious and regrettable factors is that the majority of these stereotypes were founded upon not primary but secondary sources. As Morton has pointed out, "Too few on either side are conscious, through personal acquaintance or through reading, of personalities in the other nation much like their own in culture, family, and plain human problems."[6]

On the one hand, the Chinese have visualized and stereotyped the Japanese as drug dealers and smugglers.[7] However, on the other hand, the Japanese, instead of

---

4 "The Japanese Motives," *Asia*, 38:225, April, 1938.
5 *Ibid.*, p. 223.
6 Morton, *op. cit.*, p. 308.
7 *Ibid.*, pp. 307-8.

knowing the Chinese scholar and agriculturist, have the following erroneous conception of the Chinese and their country:

The new Chinese are characterless soldiers of scrambling ambition, professional agitators and skilled talkers, who derive their technique from America and Russia, their ethics from their bellies. There is no quality of education in China, no purpose save heedless anti-Japanism. The schools turn out useless and discontented "intelligentsia," hordes of fourth-rate politicians, half-baked radicals, with party-colored shirts; they seem unable, even unwilling to discipline men properly for commerce and industry and unquestioning service to the state.[8]

As a result of the clash of adverse attitudes a form of mutual vertical distance has evolved between these two countries, i.e., the Chinese impose "vertical debasement"[9] on the Japanese because of their high regard for learning and low regard for militarism; similarly, "vertical debasement" is imposed upon the Chinese by the Japanese because the Japanese consider themselves as adapters and their continental neighbors as mere adopters of Western culture.

The two principal reasons why adverse stereotypes augment national social distance are as follows: (1) they are generally framed in deep-seated feelings of fear and hatred between international rivals, and (2) the mechanisms operating for national propaganda through the press, radio, and school rarely, if ever, are used to the same extent during peacetimes to refute these erroneous stereotyped impressions created and disseminated during a war period. These stereotypes, though they may be little more than seemingly realistic emotionalized generalizations, tend to linger through periods of relative social quiescence, acting as persistent blocks to international social nearness.

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 308.
[9] Professor E. S. Bogardus has suggested this term.

KOREA'S SOCIAL DILEMMA

EMORY S. BOGARDUS

The University of Southern California

For centuries Korea has been the battleground of the forces of oppression contending with the forces of liberty. Her history reveals the presence of the black clouds of oppression, whether independence or foreign rule has obtained. Her people have rarely been free from war lords. In years of independence, these have been Korean; in years of outside domination, the foreign militarist has been in control. Her social dilemma is found in this continuing struggle for liberty. Almost within her grasp at times, she has never been able to enjoy its beneficent advantages for long.

When you enter Korea from the north, you are impressed by the natural beauty of the country. Even picturesque Japan cannot compare with the rugged scenery of Northern Korea. Hills and mountains possess scenic value, although they are obstacles to farming. They often signify ores and mining possibilities but poor farming opportunities. Such is the case in Korea, widely known for the raising of rice but little developed as a manufacturing country.

Koreans impress the traveler by their sturdiness. They seem to possess latent forces of great personal strength. They are the survivors of stocks that have undergone many and serious hardships through the centuries. Their leaders have physiques that suggest courage and endurance.

The Koreans are noticeably taller and larger than the Japanese. They are also different in appearance from the Chinese, showing basic Mongolian characteristics that have been conditioned by centuries of struggle.

The Korean is naturally independent. He has many individualistic traits. He seeks liberty. He despises oppression and resists it doggedly. He does not forget easily. He bides his time. He is proud.

The Korean is of Turanian origin. His ancestors have trekked across the Mongolian and Manchurian plains and mountains. He is a survivor of the fittest and he prizes highly his rugged individualism. He has suffered harsh treatment at the hands of nature. He has disclosed a tendency of rugged individualism, namely, of becoming a hard taskmaster when he comes into authority. When an individualist rises from poverty to prominence, he may rule with an iron hand, even though the subjects be his own people.

The account of Korean cruelty to Korean subjects is not a pleasing one. It is long and persistent through the centuries. Rich Korean overlords, haughty and cruel, on one hand, and abject poverty, gross ignorance, and limitless misery, on the other hand, have too often been the record in Korea. However, as a new order begins to develop in Korea and a leadership emerges that would educate the masses, liberate the economically enslaved, and give freedom of thought to the millions who were the victims of superstitions, a new foe comes into control.

The attempt of Japan to rule Korea is by no means recent. This endeavor dates back to the second century A. D. It reached an early climax in the days of Hideyoshi, the Japanese general who is sometimes called "the Japanese Napoleon," when 300,000 Japanese troops were sent to conquer Korea but were unsuccessful. After the Russians were defeated, Japan established a protectorate over Korea in 1906; in 1910 she annexed Korea. But Korea still resists foreign domination.

Today Koreans are by no means appreciative of their Japanese rulers. They resist, seeking their own inde-

pendence. They are watched vigilantly lest insurrection break out. They find ironclad rules administered by what to most of them is a foreign power. Any attempts to form organizations among them by their leaders are usually thwarted at the beginning.

Some Korean children are growing up as an integral part of Japanese culture. They are being conditioned to think and feel as Japanese. Their parents, as a rule, are doing what they can to offset what they regard as unpatriotic thought and as disloyalty to an ancient Korean history and culture.

Under the influence of Christian teachings brought in by missionaries, the Korean becomes an admirable, alert, progressive, and kindly person. He moves up the scale of co-operative living. Sometimes his past, his native religion, and his rulers have kept him in illiteracy, but where Christian teachings have been progressive they have produced a type of person in Korea equal to that found in any other country. Humanitarian and democratic principles have developed under Christian influences.

The struggle to maintain the old culture in Korea continues despite all efforts to do away with the ancient loyalties. On the other hand and at the same time, the adoption of Western ways is increasing.

Korea has been a toy of fate, that is, of forces beyond her control. For the first half millenium of the Christian era, Korea was divided among three antagonistic kingdoms, one of which was known as Korai (Korea). Finally Silla conquered the others and remained supreme until the middle of the tenth century when it gave way to a new kingdom of Koryu (or Korea), which in turn was overcome by the Mongols. In 1392 the ruling house of modern Korea was established and continued in power until Korea was annexed to Japan in 1910. For centuries

Korea maintained an isolation policy and became known as "The Hermit Kingdom." This was an attempt of her rulers to protect themselves from China and Japan and other foreign powers. In recent decades she discovered another covetous neighbor in Russia. But the ending of the threat from Russia by Japan in 1905 threw Korea into the hands of Japan.

Korea has been a teacher of Japan. She has carried important phases of Chinese art, religion, language, and philosophy to Japan. She has given Japan some of the foundations of her modern development, but while so doing has sunk into low economic depths despite the richness of her resources.

Only 120 miles from Korea at the nearest point, it is natural for Japan to seek control of Korea in view of (1) the latter's need of protection from Russia and (2) her need for more markets as a means of caring for her large and growing population.

The way of force has been Korea's undoing. Her own autocrats have kept her people in economic want. Her foreign military rulers have rendered her well-nigh helpless politically.

Korea is today a cauldron of mixed feelings, sentiments, and ideas. Her leaders for the most part know what they want. They still look toward Korean independence. They are united in their will to resist oppression. If their rulers should break under foreign wars, the Koreans will not be long in staging an uprising that well may gain independence for the twenty millions of their numbers. Titanic forces are in conflict in Korea. In the long run the democratic forces are more natural, more human, and hence stronger, and likely to win.

Social Welfare

WE LIVE IN A TRAILER. By Syl MacDowell. New York: Julian Messner, Inc., 1938, 244 pp.

In this very readable volume one finds the log, written on the road, of a trailer journey beginning in October, 1936, and ending, as far as the book only is concerned, in February, 1938. The story is thus fully up to date and has, among other merits, that of presenting a wealth of minute details in the daily life of this new type of social mobility, which the trailer movement has introduced with amazing speed and volume into American life. The human story is told with the vividness of a professional writer of wild west stories in both magazines and novels dealing with the great Southwest. This trailer journey led the author and his wife over that same fascinating wonderland, beginning at Santa Monica, passing through Phoenix and Tucson, Arizona, then by way of Globe on the southern edge of the same state, through Laredo, Texas, to Mexico City, and back through the same region along the California-Oregon central valleys into the Idaho mountainous plateau and back through Santa Monica to the ruins of ancient Casa Grande, where the charming Odyssey comes to an end and goes to the publisher, while the two happy roamers follow the long trail. "Tonight Tucson, or Mexico. *Quien sabe,* who knows? The months and the miles have been good to us. We have boundless riches that mere possession can never mean. We have gained a new joy in living. Travel is a stimulant that has no let-down. For the simple but vitalizing delights of trailering, we would trade no royal ruler his scepter, for our dominion is all out-doors and our dooryard reaches to the horizon and beyond. That's why —We Live in a Trailer."

Along with a pleasant story the reader so interested will gain many firsthand accounts of the sociology of the trailering life—the kind of neighboring and community which actually goes on in a trailer camp; the public opinion of the trailering fraternity far and wide; their conflicts with local authorities and vested interests; some interesting, even challenging statistics; and at every turn, most minute and valuable information as to how one should select, furnish, handle, and be at home in a trailer. But, after all, not many can pursue their professions lucratively in the very act of living their new mode of life, as this author seems to do.

C.M.C.

BROTHERS IN CRIME. By Clifford R. Shaw with the assistance
of Henry D. McKay, James F. McDonald, and with special
chapters by Harold Hanson and E. W. Burgess. Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 1938, pp. xx+364.

The authors analyze the delinquent careers of five brothers who since
early childhood and over a period of fifteen years had engaged in similar
forms of delinquency: begging, truancy, stealing, burglary, and robbery.
The authors use a variety of sources from which to compile their data:
the child welfare agencies, the juvenile courts, the behavior clinics, and
reform schools, which dealt with these boys at the time of their appre-
hension and commitment. These official records are supplemented by
personal interviews and by extensive life histories written by the brothers
several years after their return to the community (with the exception
of the youngest one who is still confined in the penitentiary).

The records of the five brothers show considerable variation in their
physical, emotional, and mental make-ups; yet their social experiences
and social settings were very much alike. They all lived in the same
deteriorated, disorganized community throughout their life; their par-
ents were poverty-stricken throughout the childhood and youth of their
five sons; they were repeatedly subjected to the same routine of the
correctional institutions and returned to the same disorganized com-
munities and the predatory gang. Each brother also set the pattern for
the others.

The volume strikingly illustrates a number of significant points: (1)
it shows the identical effects of the cultural pattern upon the develop-
ment of divergent personalities; (2) it points to the rich inner life and
the wealth of social and personal experiences of youth which are rarely
revealed to persons who deal with youth in official and arbitrary ways;
(3) it forcibly points to the futility of the barren official record kept by
many public child-caring agencies and institutions; (4) it presents the
value of the "own story" of the deeper recesses of the life of a youth;
(5) it indicates the variety of sources from which data may be drawn.

The scientific conclusions drawn by the authors of the volume are
not new. Shaw, McKay, Burgess, Thrasher, Pauline Young, and others
have arrived at the same conclusions before, namely, that the delin-
quency career is fundamentally initiated, developed, and maintained
through the various concomitants of the cultural pattern of the disor-
ganized community and the system of juvenile institutions.

Since there is a far greater abundance of data describing the processes
of delinquency careers than of data describing methods of treatment
of such careers, one turns with eagerness to the brief chapter dealing

with "methods employed in the treatment of the brothers." However, the authors only repeat the futile formal methods used by the court and other official agencies and devote only a negligible amount of space—because of their modesty, lack of time, or the immaturity of the analysis of the method—to their own constructive methods of social treatment.

The book is exceptionally well written; it presents a variety of viewpoints and a wealth of material. The analysis is sound and scientific, and it shows the rare insight of the authors. The book should prove of considerable value to public officials, case workers, institutional administrators, child guidance workers, juvenile court judges, and teachers of juvenile delinquency.

E.F.Y.

COOPERATION OR COERCION? By L. P. JACKS. New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., Inc., 1938, pp. xvii+153.

In these essays the author points out how coercion among sovereign states creates more coercion. The failure of the League of Nations to achieve more than it has is found in its premises of using coercion in order to get nations to accept its decisions. "An armed combination of the many who would keep the peace against the one who would break it" will not work, according to Mr. Jacks. It is like employing the devil to put the devil out. Coercion of a sovereign state, whether by war or sanctions, is a failure. Let the individual states maintain armaments if they desire, but let the combination of states depend on good faith. If the League were to reverse itself and adopt a good faith basis for its ultimate recourse, then the United States would join it, believes the author.

A further suggestion is that the nations might create an international fund to be deposited in the Bank of International Settlements, for the promotion of co-operation among the nations. The nations could get this money without additional taxation by cutting down current expenditures for armaments by ten per cent. The uses of this fund that are mentioned are: "(1) the stabilization of currencies with a view to freeing the frozen currents of international trade; (2) the lowering of tariffs for the same purposes; (3) financing the distributing of raw materials by means of appropriate credits; (4) promoting international social services of the kind now carried on, but cramped for lack of funds, by the League; (5) the assistance of nations afflicted by natural calamities such as earthquakes, famine, and flood."

These proposals are worthy of careful consideration by statesmen everywhere. They represent a constructive plan which when refined may prove "a way out" for the nations, and a needed reversal of trends toward destruction. Basic problems are: How can nations, such as those of Europe, develop a genuine and trustful faith in one another? Can their conflicting ideologies be reconciled sufficiently to provide for the growth of such a faith? How far can a powerful nation whose openly announced policy is that of force be trusted?

E.S.B.

THE FIELD OF RESEARCH IN RURAL SOCIOLOGY. Prepared by a committee of the Rural Sociological Society of America and the Bureau of Agricultural Economics. Washington, D.C.: United States Department of Agriculture, 1938, pp. 47.

This report represents an appraisal of the research accomplished in the past twenty-five years, the current fields of emphasis, and the prospects for future research. The major areas of studies are: population, social organization, social psychology, social ecology, anthropological aspects, social change, social pathology. The study of cultural areas, the disadvantaged classes, differential population growth, rural youth, community integration and processes, standards and planes of living, farmers' organizations, special-interest groups, historical institutions, social psychology of leadership, the nature of rural attitudes and methods of changing them, and the extensions of these studies in new areas are timely projects.

M.H.N.

IMMIGRANT SETTLEMENTS IN CONNECTICUT: THEIR GROWTH AND CHARACTERISTICS. By SAMUEL KOENIG. Hartford: Connecticut State Department of Education, 1938, pp. 67.

Although this pamphlet is but the forerunner of a comprehensive study of immigrant life in Connecticut, now being prepared under the auspices of the Federal Writers' Project, it is in itself a lucid account of that state's immigrant life. An informative outline, the book gives statistics on the growth, characteristic features, and organized life of immigrant groups. It is supplemented by tables, charts, and a selected bibliography, which make it a valuable source book. Those interested in immigration will appreciate this detailed study and will look forward to reading the more complete treatise in preparation.

G.G.

CAUSES OF CRIME: BIOLOGICAL THEORIES IN THE
UNITED STATES, 1800-1915. By ARTHUR E. FINK.
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1938, pp.
x+309.

The author systematically examines the groundwork which has been
laid by phrenologists, physicians, psychiatrists, criminal anthropologists,
eugenists, and others for the study of the biological causes of criminal
behavior. It is not clear why he did not examine the accomplishments
of these fields up to the present time. He does not state his assumptions
or the reasons for the arbitrary choice of the period of 1800 to 1915.
Undoubtedly the more fruitful theories, based on and followed up by
research, which have developed since 1915, would also be of value to
the reader. The author concerns himself with theories relating to moral
and mental insanity, alcohol and drugs, anatomical and physiological
factors of criminal behavior, heredity and feeble-mindedness.

The book is scholarly, well documented, and quite readable. It should
be of value to students of criminology interested in a historical account
and in the interpretation of the nature and extent of the contributions
of the nineteenth century biological criminologists. The value of the
fifty-page bibliography would have been greatly enhanced if the author
had undertaken some classification and annotation of the nearly one
thousand references he has listed.

E.F.Y.

THE CULTURE OF CITIES. By LEWIS MUMFORD. New
York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1938, pp. viii+586.

This illuminating book parallels an earlier volume on *Technics and
Civilization* and, in a way, is an extension of the same treatment into
the cultural aspects of cities, reserving discussion of ethics, religion, and
education for a later time. The author begins with protection in
medieval cities and traces the development of cities, particularly the
growth of the industrial town, the rise and fall of Megalopolis, the
regional framework of civilization, and the political aspects of regional-
ism, and he concludes with a consideration of the social basis of the
new urban order. Modern cities represent shapeless giantism. Follow-
ing Patrick Geddes, six stages of city development are traced: Eopolis
(the village community); Polis (the town or city); Metropolis (the
large city); Megalopolis (marked by giantism, standardization, me-
chanical reproduction, cultural aggrandizement, overinvestment in the
material apparatus of bigness, and eventual decline); Tyrannopolis

(extension of parasitism throughout the economic and social scheme); and Nekropolis (marked by war, famine, and disease in both city and countryside).

Although history is full of burying grounds, there are possibilities of renewal. The signs of salvage can be seen in new patterns of life and thought. There are evidences of a new biotechnic civilization, an emergent economy already separated from the Neotechnic (purely mechanical) complex, which is pointing to a civilization in which the biological sciences will be freely applied to technology and oriented toward the culture of life. The modern architecture with its emphasis on economy may be regarded as a symbol of a new adaptation. Hygiene, the prolongation of youth, better housing, bipolar domesticity, the transition from a money economy to a life economy, and the socialization of life are evidences of a capacity for renewal and for a new urban order.

Thirty-two pages of illustrations (pictures), together with the descriptions of the photos, form an integral part of the book. Fifty-five pages of bibliography and the discussion of bibliographical material form another valuable part of the volume.   M.H.N.

Social Psychology

TIME-BUDGETS OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR. By Pitirim A. Sorokin and Clarence Q. Berger. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1939, pp. xi+204.

On the basis of records kept by about 100 individuals from day to day for four weeks, the authors present tentative answers to the following questions: Of what specific activities does the whole of human behavior consist? What is the succession of these activities? What are the sex-age-occupation differences in the content and duration of behavior day by day? What are the motives and how are they related to the whole pattern of human behavior? What activities are conducted in solitude, and what in the company of others? How far in advance can an individual predict his own activities?

The subjects were chiefly female, white, single, of long residence in or near Boston, of ages largely between twenty and thirty, and of high school education. They were either relief workers under the Works Progress Administration or white-collar unemployed in Boston. The study was made in 1935. Each person kept a record according to

definite schedules furnished him by five-minute periods. Each person made each record immediately, or as soon after the activity was over as possible. The authors do not seem to allow sufficiently for a weakness in method at this point. In other words, if a person's attention is continually centered on making a record of each of his activities as soon as it is over, how far is his behavior going to vary from what his behavior would have been if he had had no thought of recording and of analyzing it according to a schedule?

After reviewing other time-activity studies, the authors present their data. The activities freely described by the subjects have been classified by the authors under a total of fifty-five headings. In general, sleep is given eight hours and twenty-four minutes daily; eating, one hour and twenty-nine minutes per day; physical exercise, fourteen minutes; personal care, seventy-seven minutes; transportation, eighty-six minutes; walking, fifty-five and one-half minutes; shopping, seventy-four minutes; work (for others remuneratively), five and one-half hours. It is suggested that "out of every twenty-four hours about eighteen are spent in activities satisfying physical and economic needs." Civic and political activities are given one tenth of a minute a day. Talking takes fifty-six minutes. Religious activities average eight minutes for the whole number studied, and forty and eight-tenths minutes for those who participate in religious exercises. The movie and the theater get 186 minutes per participant, but art receives attention from only one per cent of the group. Dancing averages 147.9 minutes per day per participant; and automobile riding, 174.5 minutes per participant.

Several other questions are discussed concretely and significantly. The subjects were asked to predict their activities for a day or more in advance, and then to check and see how far their predictions came true. Again, the validity of the method may be seriously questioned. How far will one be affected in his behavior by predicting his own behavior? Even so, the results show interesting and extensive variations from the predictions. Despite the weaknesses in method, this study is exceedingly valuable and stands at the top of similar inquiries.

E.S.B.

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY. By DANIEL KATZ and RICHARD L. SCHANCK. New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1938, pp. xiv+700.

The authors, both psychologists, have broadened out social psychology to include a portion of sociology, of biology, of history, as well as of psychology. In fact, Part I is called descriptive and sociological, and

deals not only with uniform behavior as found in taboos, rituals, and verbal stereotypes, but also with atypical conduct and with social institutions. Part II is entitled "The Scientific Basis of Social Process." It centers attention on the motivation and mechanisms of social behavior. Part III is concerned with the social world of the clinician and with the development and integration of personality. The concluding section, or Part IV, bears the label, "The World of the Social Engineer: Social Context and Social Change," and describes "the epoch of the rural community" and the era of publics and of social classes. As a result of the decline "of the rural community as a stimulus situation," there has come about a decline in the mores.

A wide range of research materials has been combed. The utilization of these data has been carried out in a systematic and sensible way. The points of view and style of thought may be illustrated by the following quotations: "Personality is the concept under which we subsume the individual's characteristic ideational, emotional, and motor reactions and the characteristic organization of these responses." "The essential dilemma of personality integration in complex cultures is that the very society which makes men narrow specialists also presents them with ever broader fields to which to adjust." "The fascist goal of regimentation is unconsciously approached by those capitalists who desire an ideal working class made of men who work hard, ask for little, spend that little upon necessities rather than drink, starve through depressions without complaining, and raise their children to follow in their footsteps."

The book is well written and will prove popular and useful. Its contribution to social psychology lies largely in its organization of materials, its social viewpoint, and its emphasis upon "wholeness" rather than upon particularization.

E.S.B.

THE OPEN MIND. ELMER ERNEST SOUTHARD, 1876-1920. By FREDERICK P. GAY. New York: Normandie House, 1938, pp. xiii+324.

This extensive biographical sketch of Elmer Ernest Southard, who first seriously plotted out the field of psychiatric social work, has been enthusiastically written by his intimate friend, Frederick P. Gay. Although Dr. Southard lived only forty-four years, these years were crowded with an unbounded energy that was peculiarly fitted for intensive and inspirational research into psychology, philosophy, and pathology. To read of his quest for knowledge is alone stimulating, for to the end he is revealed to have had a boyish kind of vivacity for

revealing the new. Southard had adopted the idea that the "pathological approach" was the one best fitted to reveal the nature of the normal, and his well-known book *The Kingdom of Evils* is developed through this method. That health is best preserved through a knowledge of disease; that education depends on understanding forms of ignorance; that reformation predicates a conception of the vices,—these indicate the trend of his thought on the methods which he was continually utilizing to eradicate the evils of life as he came into contact with them. Social workers will be particularly interested in the discussion of chapters 10, 11, and 14, which deal with the contributions of Southard, the psychiatrist, to social work. Here was an eminent student who devoted his few years to a full measure of research for practical use.

M.J.V.

CONTRIBUTIONS TO PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY. The Conceptual Representation and the Measurement of Psychological Forces. By KURT LEWIN. Durham: Duke University Press, 1938, pp. 247.

This rather lengthy monograph reveals the results of an intensive excursion into the field of graphic measurements of psychological forces. The author believes that a present-day task of psychology is one of conceptually representing and deriving psychological processes in order to understand and demonstrate more scientifically the causes of human behavior. The older psychologies have long dealt with the idea of force, drive, libido, instinct, and the like in an effort to indicate that behavior is caused by directed entities. But there lurked about all of these an aura of speculation; hence, the modern attempts to be conceptually definite and empirical; Dr. Lewin's aim is, then, to aid these by bringing "into the open some of the basic concepts and assumptions which objectively are presupposed in practically all psychological research in this field." A very clear and able discussion is presented in regard to the mathematical properties inherent in the idea of force, its directions and velocities; and in the ideas of the goal, its dimensions and construction, the author utilizing for the former a geometry which he calls "hectological space" rather than Euclidean space. While the reading is heavily laden with the appearance of mathematical formulae, the ideas are presented with a clear-cut, supple preciseness that is admirable. What emerges as a result of this research is a valuable contribution to the better understanding and meaning of "force" in modern psychology.

M.J.V.

Races and Culture

JAPAN SPEAKS OUT. By Shingoro Takaishi. Tokyo: The Hokuseido Press, 1938, pp. 173.

Mr. Shingoro Takaishi, editor-in-chief of Japan's two leading newspapers, the *Tokyo Nichi-Nichi* and *Osaka Mainichi,* sets forth a number of significant explanations of Japan's "peaceful economic expansion" in China. Inasmuch as the greater part of the book is composed of speeches which were written and given by the author before American audiences, a great deal of repetition occurs.

According to the author's reasoning, Japan's primary purpose in disciplining China is to bring about some form of economic collaboration that will "naturally" be advantageous to Japan's destiny. Mr. Takaishi constantly reiterates statements such as the following: "Since Japan finds herself in a position wherein industrialization is the only road of national advancement, she must be assured of an adequate market and supply of raw materials within her geographical proximity. This need is paramount for Japan's healthy growth." Throughout the book the author uses a type of logic which will be thought inconsistent by Westerners. However, in spite of any criticisms that Westerners might have or make of the book, it still remains the best expression available of Japan's policy and rationalizations of the contemporary Sino-Japanese situation.

E.C.McD.

WHY HITLER CAME INTO POWER. By Theodore Abel. New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1938, pp. ix+322.

By an ingeniously contrived literary contest the author collected six hundred unpublished, original life stories of Hitler's followers, stating who they are, giving their background and past experiences, how the Nazi movement was promoted, and how they happened to join the movement. The material is divided into three parts. First, it gives the historical background of Nazism, divided into five periods from the revolution in 1918 to the victory in 1933. Second, it gives an analysis of discontent, the ideology behind the movement, and the why of Hitler's popularity. Third, it presents in full six selected, typical life histories. Discontent provided the soil in which Nazism could grow. The ideas of *Gemeinschaft,* National Socialism, the principles of leader-

ship, and anti-Semiticism found rootage in this soil. The tactics and strategy of the leaders did the rest. The respondents, as might be expected, show great enthusiasm for Hitler and his program. By using firsthand material the author avoided guesses and preconceived notions as to Hitler's popularity; but since life histories come from Hitler's supporters, the reader gets a one-sided picture of conditions in Germany and of National Socialism.

M.H.N.

THE HAWAIIAN KINGDOM, 1778-1854, Foundation and Transformation. By RALPH S. KUYKENDALL. Honolulu: The University of Hawaii, 1938, pp. vii+453.

It will be a long time before this book will be superseded by any other in its particular field. It has been done exceedingly well. Only the discovery of new source materials will make a new volume necessary.

The author begins with ancient Hawaii, proceeds to the coming of the foreigners, gives considerable space to Kamehameha I and his major successors, and discusses the development of agriculture, the land revolution, the birth of constitutional government, and the shadow of destiny, due to the extension of the United States to the shores of the Pacific. Each new development is treated objectively and with understanding and fairness. The treatise needs to be followed by another covering the changes, particularly the plantation development and the immigration of the races during the concluding decades of the last century and the opening decades of the present century. However, it affords an excellent background for studying the developments of the past seventy-five years in the Islands. Polynesian sailors, British adventurers, whalers, missionaries, land division, governmental transformation—these are some of the key words in the story of the Islands as told by Mr. Kuykendall.

E.S.B.

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL EUROPE. By HENRI PIRENNE. First American Edition. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1937, xii+243.

The dearth of historical knowledge of our own past, strange as it may seem, is often responsible for the sociologist relying too much upon current manifestations and anthropological data for his conclusions. This

lack can be partially satisfied, at least, through Henri Pirenne's useful volume, *Economic and Social History of Medieval Europe*.

This work skillfully weaves together the economic and social interactions of the medieval period. Of special interest from the sociological standpoint is the author's treatment of land and the rural classes, wherein population pressure and its effects are strikingly portrayed. There are also excellent accounts of the growth of urban communities and their evolving socioeconomic adjustments, and the catastrophes of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries together with the far-reaching social disturbances which they caused. With greater emphasis upon the economic than upon the sociological are several chapters dealing with the evolution of trade and commerce throughout the medieval era. Special attention is given to the rise of a money economy and to the growing dependence upon credit in the urban areas.

E. E. MUNTZ

SOUTHERN REGIONS OF THE UNITED STATES. By HOWARD ODUM. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1936, pp. xi+664.

This mighty volume was prepared for the Southern Regional Committee of the Social Science Research Council. No single review can do justice to the broad content of the data presented, to the painstaking methods of research used in the study, and to the depth of the conclusions at which Professor Odum arrives. The Southern regions are considered from their geographical and historical backgrounds, their cultural setting, their racial composition, their economic and agricultural problems, their ecological processes—all combined to present a composite picture of rare insight and broadest appreciation.

There is rarely a page in the volume which is not accompanied by an interesting chart, graph, or statistical table, to illustrate the more general discussion and to provide a scientific basis for the facts presented. One may well marvel at the variety of research methods used, at the diversity of source materials presented, and at the logic of the plan of study pursued.

The analysis of the life, resources, characteristics, and problems of the Southern regions is intricately related to the whole national picture: natural richness and abundance, social waste and deficiency, institutions and folkways, and social planning.

The volume is a veritable encyclopedia on Southern regions in the United States and an excellent illustration of a research study in social ecology.

E.F.Y.

Social Work

A HISTORICAL SUMMARY OF STATE SERVICES FOR CHILDREN IN MASSACHUSETTS. Bureau Publication No. 239. Part 4. Washington: United States Printing Office, 1938, pp. 50.

SALARIES IN MEDICAL SOCIAL WORK IN 1937. By RALPH G. HURLIN. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1938, pp. 34.

HOURS AND EARNINGS IN CERTAIN MEN'S-WEAR INDUSTRIES—SEAMLESS HOSIERY. Bulletin of the Women's Bureau, No. 163-3. Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1938, pp. 8.

A complete survey of the field and development of child welfare in Massachusetts and a description of the state department of public welfare are included in *A Historical Summary of State Services for Children in Massachusetts*. Massachusetts provided, at the time of the study, a comprehensive but unevenly developed program for caring for dependent, neglected, illegitimate, delinquent, mentally handicapped, physically handicapped, blind and deaf, and problem children and also for the care of adoptive cases.

The booklet, *Salaries in Medical Social Work in 1937,* contains data gathered from 507 agencies employing 1,708 full-paid medical social workers. Included is a comparison of these salaries with another year's salaries: also comparisons by cities, by types of institutions, and by the amount of education of the workers.

Hours and Earnings in Certain Men's-Wear Industries—Seamless Hosiery includes detailed statistics of average weekly earnings by states and sex, hours worked, and averages and distributions of hourly earnings. A short, interpretative explanation accompanies the statistics.

J.B.

HANDBOOK ON SOCIAL CASE RECORDING. By MARGARET COCHRAN BRISTOL. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, second impression, second edition, 1938, pp. xii +219.

The practical and helpful nature of this book cannot be overemphasized. It has been developed out of extended and varied experiences in case recording. It takes up first of all some of the essentials of com-

mendable case recording, and discusses these pro and con. It is clear, cautious, and constructive. The essentials that are analyzed are: accuracy, objectivity, brevity and conciseness, ease of reference and visibility, clarity, color, and uniformity and "up-to-dateness."

In the second part of the book, the various mechanisms necessary for satisfactory case recording are discussed. The major topics are: the first interview, the narrative, letters, summaries, the case analysis and associated processes, and ethics of recording. Each of these subjects is illustrated at length from case materials, and each of the "cases" is commented upon succinctly both favorably and unfavorably. The painstaking and thoughtful procedure of the author is illustrated by many discriminating statements. For example, she states, "there seems good reason to believe that in the future recording for purposes of case-work practice will be toward placing more responsibility upon the recorder for being objective in securing, observing, and interpreting data and less emphasis upon the formalistic methods of making the record objective."

E.S.B.

NATURE AND USE OF THE CUMULATIVE RECORD. By David Segel.   United States Department of the Interior, Office of Education, Bulletin No. 3, 1938, pp. 48.

Inasmuch as a considerable number of school counselors are realizing that the cumulative record is one of the most useful tools for pupil guidance, many schools throughout the nation are adopting and improving systems of cumulative record keeping. A good cumulative record should reveal the development of the child's intellectual abilities, social adjustments, and physical traits. This bulletin not only describes adequately the various types of cumulative records found in different schools but also makes practical suggestions for cumulative record keeping by presenting ways of recording different types of items.   E.C.McD.

Photoplay Notes

Pygmalion is replete with subtle and manifold social observations and thrusts. Some are doubtless not planned by Shaw, and others that he intended probably go unrecognized. One of the subtle satires appeals less in the United States than in England. It is a criticism of the Englishman's sometimes careless use of the English language. But if the Englishman is stupid in this regard, how about the American? An obvious process that occurs at great length is that of changing the speech and manners of a poor flower girl into the ways of a duchess. So well done is the training that the deception is complete. The erstwhile flower girl of the street is accepted and honored by royalty as one of their very own. Although the process is arduous and ludicrous mistakes are made, the final product in the form of a duchess is perfect. In connection with this transformation there may be noted in the play the operation of the distressing chasms between classes in England. The bland way in which these class distinctions are generally accepted is demonstrated. For instance, the middle class accepts both the class above and that below without question or evidence of a desire to change the situation. The poor accept their lowly status with grumbling but otherwise peaceably and without being provoked to action. Most pitiable of all is the attitude of "society," which lives in its state, exalted chiefly and sometimes only by birth and tradition, without showing the slightest qualms of conscience. Then comes a mere professor of phonetics and by skill and art changes in course of time a waif of the street into such a "lady" that royalty are hoodwinked into accepting her completely. In other words, what do England's vaulted class distinctions rest upon? Differences in human nature or even latent ability? No, on a certain training in ways of speech and dress and manners. The difference is not in blood or birth or historic family connections but in the ways in which you pronounce your words! Again, the play illustrates how a person may become so wrapped up in and attached to that which has received his attention and effort over a period of time that he discovers that he cannot get along without it. The creator of the "duchess," although he knows her lowly origins, becomes aware of an attachment that even he, willful and stubborn as he is, cannot deny and from which he cannot escape, try as hard as he may.

E.S.B.

Social Fiction

THE YEARLING. By Marjorie Kiunan Rawlings. New
York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1938, pp. 428.

Mrs. Rawlings' *The Yearling* is a delightfully enchanting novel tell-
ing the story of the three Baxters, Penny, Jody, and Ma, who live on
Baxter's Island in the midst of the Florida "hammock" country. Most
of the events are seen through the eyes of twelve-year-old Jody, who,
as he comes to life with the aid of the novelist's skillful touch, may yet
come to take his rightful place with such characters as Huckleberry
Finn and David Copperfield. This regional story of inland Florida
reveals the struggles of the Baxters with the caprices of the weather,
the bears, the wolves, and the wild cats. Penny, nicknamed for his
small stature, understands thoroughly and sympathetically the inward
longings of his "yearling" Jody for companionship. Little Jody is in a
sense a child of isolation despite the fact that he and his father carry
on a beautiful father-son relationship. A high point in the story is
reached when he allows Jody to adopt a baby fawn, afterward called
Flag, to have and to play with forever. Jody with Flag romps through
the tale, with Ma Baxter continually getting upset by Flag's mis-
chievousness, thereby enabling Penny to exert his masterly technique for
adjudicating the dilemmas which face Jody. Penny is adept too, for he is
a storyteller and a homely philosopher as well as a woodman.

Other characters, such as the bold, bad Forrester men and Grandma
Hutto, are likewise deftly sketched and add considerable raciness to the
otherwise simple story. For excitement, there are hunting scenes de-
picting the shrewdness and cunning of these Florida folk, the best of
all being the chase of old Stewfoot, the bear who has evaded and out-
witted them all for more than a year and who dies as a heroic bear
should at the hands of undaunted Penny and Jody. One just cannot put
the book down until he knows the outcome of this great struggle! *The
Yearling* is one of the finest of regional novels, and the best that Mrs.
Rawlings has done.

M.J.V.